

USAID/ANGOLA:

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE EVALUATION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
PREFACE	ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	iii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. The Scope and Implementation Structure of USAID/Angola’s SO 2	1
B. Evaluation Focus and Methods	2
C. Study Constraints and Limitations	7
II. PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND DIRECT RESULTS (OUTPUTS).....	9
A. National Democratic Institute (NDI).....	11
B. International Republican Institute (IRI)	12
C. Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT)	13
D. World Learning	15
E. America’s Development Foundation (ADF).....	16
F. Mississippi Consortium for International Development (MCID).....	18
III. PROGRAM OUTCOMES	19
A. Are Activities Leading to the Achievement of the Strategic Objective?	22
B. What have Angolan organizations and institutions gained from USAID’s DG assistance?	35
C. What have Angolans gained from USAID’s DG assistance?	37
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	38
A. Conclusions	38
B. Recommendations	39

ANNEXES

- A. Current Angolan Political and Economic Context
- B. Evaluation Scope of Work
- C. MSI Evaluation Framework
- D. MSI Questionnaire Guideline
- E. List of Documents Consulted
- F. Evaluation Events: Meeting Schedule
- G. Sample of Data Form for USAID Partners
- H. NDI Data Summary Sheet
- I. IRI Data Summary Sheet
- J. PACT Data Summary Sheet
- K. World Learning Data Summary Sheet
- L. ADF Data Summary Sheet
- M. MCID Data Summary Sheet

PREFACE

The team for this evaluation wishes to thank the USAID's democracy and governance grantees for their support and assistance throughout the study period. Resident project managers from PACT, ADF, MCID and World Learning were particularly helpful in coordinating meetings in Luanda and arranging the team's trip to Huila and Namibe provinces. Full cooperation was also forthcoming from NDI's staff in Luanda. The team also wishes to thank the Director, Manager of D&G Programs and other staff of USAID/Angola and Ambassador Joseph Sullivan and the Embassy's Pol/Econ Officer for their assistance.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the performance of USAID/Angola's Democracy and Governance (D&G) activities—to strengthen civil society organizations and political institutions – from 1996 to the present. This should contribute to planning future activities (years 2000 to 2005) and help USAID/Angola improve the quality and effectiveness of its programs. The evaluation focused on three key questions: 1) Are the activities leading to the strategic objective? 2) What have Angolan organizations and institutions gained from USAID's D&G assistance? and 3) What have Angolans gained from USAID's D&G assistance?

USAID/Angola's SO 2 Democracy and Governance (D&G) activities are being implemented in a country that has been plagued by war since 1961, with only brief intervals of cease-fire. Since 1990 Angola has had two peace processes accompanied by fragile cease-fire periods. The first was the Bicesse agreement which led to the September 1992 elections. War resumed after the elections as Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, UNITA's leader, charged fraud and refused to accept the election results. A second internationally driven effort resulted in the Lusaka Protocol of November 1994 under which both sides agreed to a process which included a cease-fire, unified army, government of national unity, and transformation of UNITA from an armed revolutionary movement into a political party. The United Nations was mandated to verify and monitor implementation of the Protocol. Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was plagued with problems, including ambiguous commitment by both sides,¹ mutual distrust, and sporadic armed clashes which caused the U.N. to delay deployment of its monitoring force. Deployment the U.N. "Blue Helmets" was not complete until 1996, by which time both sides were regularly violating terms of the Lusaka agreement. In 1996, the 70 UNITA legislators elected in 1992 took their seats in the National Assembly, along with the handful of legislators from small parties and the MPLA. Despite considerable progress in implementing the agreement, the burden of suspicion, and perhaps both sides hope for a victory, proved too great for the peace process to withstand and war broke out again in late 1998.

USAID's Strategic Objective 2 (SO 2) "Increased National Reconciliation Through Strengthened Civil Society and Political Institutions" was developed at a time when optimism about the peace process appeared justified (1995-96). A basic assumption was that the peace process would continue and that USAID's activities would be implemented in that context. USAID implementation partners worked with political parties and parliamentarians toward this objective. Seminars, workshops, and theatrical plays which were broadcast on TV and radio provided training in pluralism and tolerance were aimed at shaping attitudes favorable to national reconciliation. USAID's program assisted political parties strengthen their organizations. For example, three parties reported reorganizations following USAID-sponsored training. The outbreak of war invalidated the "reconciliation" aspect of SO 2 and it constrained somewhat, but

¹ UNITA leader Savimbi's ambiguity about the Lusaka agreement was evident from the beginning. Simultaneous with the Lusaka signing ceremony, Government forces were attacking UNITA-held town in Angola. Savimbi did not attend the signing ceremony in Lusaka and attributed this to the MPLA's military actions. He delegated authority to sign the Lusaka accord to a subordinate.

did not stop, the work aimed at preparation of political parties, parliamentarians and the civil society for meaningful participation in a democratic political system.

Despite the resumption of war in several parts of the country, USAID implementation partner's activities with non-government organizations (NGOs) appear to have been effective in strengthening civil society groups. The activities aimed at changing attitudes, such as seminars and plays, some of which have broad radio and/or television audiences in addition to the participants and "live" audiences have continued. Some government officials attend and participate in these activities. Much of the results data that the team received, however, is anecdotal or testimony obtained during focus group meetings with participants and beneficiaries. Only two of USAID's partners conduct pre and post-activity evaluations of target groups/participants.

A full discussion of the evaluation's recommendations and their justification is contained in section 4.2 of this report. Only some are discussed in this summary. Consideration should be given to revising the SO 2 to more fully connect with current realities. With an active war going on national reconciliation is at best a long-term possibility which would require a strategy for ending the war and actively working with both sides of the conflict in addition to political parties and groups of the civil society. This appears to be beyond the scope and resources of the D&G project. However, the activities being implemented contribute in important ways to elements of SO 2 that focus on strengthening civil society and Angolan political institutions. A forward looking program that continues USAID's focus on these two objectives, perhaps as separate SOs, appears to be well justified. Other recommendations for strengthening USAID's current program and adapting it to future needs are provided in Section IV.2

Among these is a recommendation that encourages USAID to not only build on past success, but to also include new program elements that can enhance its ability to realize progress in both the CSO and political institutions side of its D&G program. In this context, ways of supplementing the current program's focus on "bottom up", "demand side" development are explored. In this section, the team also notes that a dual transition is underway in Angola. It is moving from a political system based on the principles of "democratic centralism" (i.e., Marxist-Leninism) toward a democratic multiparty system. This is not an easy transition. Not all leaders of the ruling party favor this move, yet they recognize that with the demise of the Soviet Union and the conditions on economic assistance imposed by Western financial institutions that, however reluctantly, they must take that road. Therefore, it should not be surprising if progress is uneven. The second transition, which is temporarily stalled due to the war, is the transition from a 30-year environment of war to peace and stability. In these circumstances attention might well be given to working for change by focusing on "targets of opportunity." Although some leaders in the ruling party and government continue to resist the movement toward democracy and a pluralist system, others appear willing to work in that direction.

I. Introduction

USAID/Angola operates its program of foreign assistance under extremely difficult circumstances. Angola's government, which represents the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and is led by President Eduardo dos Santos, seems perpetually to be but a day away from full scale war with the country's other strong faction, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi. This political stalemate, which is reviewed in greater detail in Annex A, inevitably affects the way in which USAID and its implementing partners operate. Of necessity, program approaches are flexible, taking advantage of opportunities and shifting among on-going program activities to work as effectively as is feasible in those areas where action is possible. This is particularly true for USAID/Angola's Democracy and Governance Program under the Mission's Strategic Objective (SO) 2.

With this context in mind, USAID nonetheless determined that there is a good deal to be learned for the future from an evaluation of its SO 2 efforts. Accordingly, the USAID/Angola developed an evaluation scope of work that called for a review of Mission-funded democracy and governance activities from 1996 to the present and an assessment of their contribution to the realization of the Mission's SO 2 and the Intermediate Results (IRs) which support it. (A copy of the USAID/Angola Scope of Work is included as Annex B.) The Mission contracted with Management Systems International (MSI) to carry out this evaluation.

A. The Scope and Implementation Structure of USAID/Angola's SO 2

USAID/Angola has maintained a steady commitment to its Democracy and Governance Strategic Objective over a five year period. The Mission's statement of this objective in its FY 1995: *Increased national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions* is echoed in the USAID/Angola FY 2000 Results Review and Resource Request (R4).

The Results Framework the Mission developed in 1995 to support SO2 is shown in Figure 1. It is this conceptualization of how the democracy and governance sector might evolve in Angola that initially guided the Mission's effort to put in place a series of grants to U.S.-based non-governmental organizations through which program activities in support of SO 2 could be carried out. In 1996, USAID/Angola initiated grants with four entities: the International Republican Institute (IRI) June 1996, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in September 1996; World Learning, Inc., (WL) also in September 1996, and PACT (Private Agencies Collaborating Together) in October 1996.

By 1997, USAID and its implementing partners reached a point where a reexamination of the conceptual framework for the democracy and governance sector in Angola seemed to be warranted. As USAID's SOW for this evaluation explains, meetings held in that year led, over time, to a reconceptualization of the Results Framework for SO2. In 1998, this new conceptualization, which is shown in Figure 2, was approved by the Mission, but based on discussions with USAID/Washington, USAID/Angola decided to wait until 1999 to formally shift to this new framework. As a result, the Mission's FY 2000 R4 reports on a slight

modification of the democracy and governance sector in terms of the 1995 framework shown in Figure 1, i.e., IR 4 is no longer an active element.

Even as it decided to wait to shift to a new Results Framework for SO2, USAID/Angola moved ahead in 1998 to add three new implementing entities to the critical mass it had assembled to address this sector. Through an inter-agency agreement, the Voice of America became a formal USAID partner in this sector. In addition, the Mission brought on board two other new entities: the America's Development Foundation (ADF), in September 1998, and the Mississippi Consortium for International Development (MCID), in October 1998.

The seven organizations cited above represent the core of USAID/Angola's implementation effort on behalf of SO 2. Activities undertaken by these organizations have, over the past four years, spanned the full range of IRs shown in Figure 1. Much of their on-going work is also relevant to the transition to a new Results Framework for SO 2. In addition to the activities undertaken by these seven organizations, USAID's work on behalf of SO 2 is supported by complimentary efforts initiated by a growing number of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

B. Evaluation Focus and Methods

USAID's SOW for this evaluation describes its purpose in forward looking terms, noting that its examination of the impact of USAID's democracy and governance activities on civil society organizations and institutions should, among other things, cull best practices from this experience that can be used by the Mission to improve the quality of future activities in the sector.

Providing a clear focus for the research carried out as part of this evaluation, USAID's SOW identified the three main questions the study was to address:

❖ QUESTION 1: *Are the activities leading to the achievement of the strategic objective?*

Is the approved strategy still valid and relevant to Angola's democratic development? Do Intermediate Results indicators validate their contribution to the strategic objective? What activities are the most successful and why? Which program outputs are achieving their intended outcomes? Are short-term (2-5 days) seminars/workshops effective in achieving the desired results or longer period of time is required? In the face of limited resources, should resources be directed to programs that operate at the community, local or national level? What aspects of USAID's assistance (civil society or political institution) have had the greatest impact on Angola's democratic development? What works and what does not? What program sequences make sense?

Figure 1. USAID/Angola SO2 Results Framework, circa 1995





Figure 2. Revised SO 2 Results Framework, approved in 1998



❖ **QUESTION 2: What have Angolan organizations and institutions gained from USAID's DG assistance?**

What impact does USAID's DG activities have on strengthening civil society organizations capacities to represent citizens' needs? Has there been any increase in the administrative and management capacities of Angolan non-governmental organizations? Is there any significant interest, by NGOs, to engage in human rights promotion and protection? Have the media training programs improved the technical ability of journalists to inform the public on governance issues? Was the National Assembly able to get the Executive branch of government to be more transparent and accountable? Has there been any substantial difference in the quality of debate in the National Assembly? Are political parties using more participatory techniques, by including more party members, in decision-making processes? Have political parties' hierarchies included more women?

❖ **QUESTION 3: What have Angolans gained from USAID's DG assistance?**

What impact does USAID's DG activities have on intended program beneficiaries²? Was there any increase in citizens' ability to exercise democratic rights and responsibilities during 1996-1998 timeframe? Is there any increase in MPs' constituent outreach and relations? Have there been more women engaged politically?

In developing a methodology for carrying out an evaluation that would address these questions and concerns, MSI recognized the need to be as flexible in the way it looked at USAID's democracy and governance as the Mission and its implementing partners had found it necessary to be when faced with the resumption of internal warfare in 1998 and the concomitant changes in the political and economic environment. These changes in circumstances, over which neither the Mission nor its partners had control, forced both USAID/Angola and its partners amend their strategies and reconsider their ability to reach all of the program's intended beneficiaries.

Accordingly, MSI has used a "chain of events" approach to the collection and analysis of data that reflects both the USAID's initial intent for the sector and modifications imposed upon the Mission and its partners by hostile conditions. This rolling or "chain of events" approach involved:

- Examining the situation as it existed in 1995-96 and the way in which expectations at that time influence the formulation of grants and other implementation arrangements that involved activities in support of SO2;

² USAID/Angola conceives all Angolans as the ultimate beneficiaries of its DG assistance activities. However, the direct beneficiaries, to date, are: organized civil society groups, such as NGOs and CBOs; Members of the National Assembly; Local Government Administrators; Political Parties; Journalists; and Human Rights activists.

- Reviewing what activities, of those initially contemplated, were actually undertaken as well as examining those that were modified or substituted for planned activities.
- Determining what were the immediate results (outputs) of these activities;
- Identifying the outcome level effects these outputs generated, including impacts at the level of the IRs that support SO 2 (per the original conceptualization of the sector shown in Figure 1), and
- Documenting other program benefits.

The “chain of events” approach outlined above allows for both a “goal-oriented” focus (i.e., is the SO being achieved?) and for discovery about both the impact of program modifications and unintended consequences. Yet, importantly, the “chain of events” approach to evaluation also allowed the team to move away from pre-conceptions about what should demonstrate program success to look at the actual effects of activities that implementing entities found it feasible to undertake.

MSI’s approach to the evaluation, as well as the instruments the team would use, were developed when the American members of the evaluation team met in Washington prior to the departure for Luanda. The team, with the assistance of two evaluation/methodologist specialists developed an initial program evaluation and questionnaire to guide the team’s work in Angola (Annex C and D). As designed, the evaluation was expected to rely heavily on key informant interviews and documentary records for data. Focus groups were also one of the data collection strategies the team included in its plans on an “if feasible” basis. Given the nature of the democracy and governance sector, and the USAID/Angola program, the team identified potential problems with quantifying many of the changes the Mission’s SO 2 was intended to bring about, but decided that quantification would be included in the design on a “best efforts” basis. Reliance on multiple rather than single sources of evidence was another principle espoused in the evaluation design the team prepared.

The first day of this evaluation planning session was attended by USAID/Angola’s D&G Officer Yinka Oyinlola and Susan Jay from USAID/Washington’s Center for Democracy and Governance. The team also met with Keith Simmons, USAID/Angola Mission Director while in Washington. The evaluation methodology and questionnaire were presented to USAID/Washington and the D&G Officer for USAID/Angola prior to departure for Luanda.³ In addition, the evaluation team also met in person, or in the case of MCID talked on the telephone, with headquarter offices of most of the USAID/Angola democracy and governance program partners (grantees and contractors) in Washington prior to departure. Despite several attempts, however, the team was unable to meet with representatives from the International Republican Institute. Available documents on each program were requested from each of the program partners the team was able to contact..

³ The D & G Program Officer, Yinka Oyinlola, recommended changes to the evaluation methodology in a letter dated 7 September and received by the team in Luanda on 10 September, which is included as Annex 4. These recommendations have been incorporated in the evaluation.

In country, MSI's evaluation was carried out over a period of 20 days, from September 2 to September 22, 1999. The team's two American members, John Blacken and Gregory Meyers were joined by Angolan team member, Mario de Sousa. During its time working together in Angola, the team reviewed an extensive array of documents (listed in Annex E) and conducted approximately 38 meetings (27 key informant interviews and 11 focus groups), with 164 people.

In addition to meetings and interviews in Luanda, the evaluation team visited the provinces of Huila and Namibe, where four of the USAID's program partners (ADF, PACT, MCID and World Learning) have on-going program activities. Approximately 52 NGOs and associations in Luanda, Namibe and Huila participated in the focus group meetings. Twenty-seven representatives from government participated in ten of the interviews. The team also interviewed representatives from five political parties. Finally, the team attended one seminar on corruption and met with representatives from Agostinho Neto University. Annex F provides a complete list of interviews and focus groups.

Meetings with USAID's implementing partners in Angola represent a critical early step in the evaluation process. The teams initial meeting with implementing partners on September 6th involved representatives from all six of the democracy and governance program partners: NDI, IRI, PACT, World Learning, ADF and MCID. In this meeting, the goals of the evaluation were explained, briefings with each partner were scheduled and each partner was asked to provide the team with relevant program documents and a list of Angolan collaborators and beneficiaries to be interviewed. USAID's implementation partners were also asked to supply the team with all relevant data which would help the team to evaluate the partner's objectives and accomplishments. In addition, the evaluation team presented each partner with a team-designed Data Summary Sheet (as shown Annex G). These "sheets" were designed to help the partners focus presentation of data on their respective programs, activities, outputs, and best practices. The evaluation team took special care to focus on gender in the collection of data. Each partner was asked to provide beneficiary data desegregated by gender, and whenever possible USAID's implementation partners were asked about gender issues in either their management structure or in the issues they address. The information from these reports was used, in part, to develop the summaries presented in section two of this report.

C. Study Constraints and Limitations

Despite the many interviews the team was able to conduct, the evaluation as conducted faced a number of important limitations and impediments. These, in a rough order of importance, include:

- Security limitations that prevented the team from visiting most areas of the country, including some areas where USAID's partners have worked in the period from 1996 to 1998.
- A serious lack of cooperation from one of the program's main implementing entities: IRI. For unexplained reasons, IRI, was unresponsive to the evaluation team. The team was unable to meet with or gather documents from IRI. The team views this limitation as unfortunate as the work being done by IRI was, and continues to be,

important.⁴ Nevertheless, the team acquired available documents from USAID/Angola on IRI activities and met with individuals who had participated in IRI training activities. The Grantee Data Sheet for IRI was filled in by the evaluation team based on partial information and without direct input from IRI. Consequently there may be errors in this sheet as well as the summary of IRI activities presented in the following section.

- Late participation in the evaluation by another implementing entity: NDI. Beyond its initial meeting with USAID's program partners, the evaluation team was unable to meet with NDI staff until roughly 4 days before it had to leave Angola. NDI staff reluctance to participate stemmed from a desire on their part to wait for the arrival of a new field director. While this delay satisfied internal NDI needs, it severely limited the evaluation team's opportunity to probe the impact of this USAID partner's program.
- Inadequate elapsed time had passed for determining the impact of the newest USAID/Angola democracy and governance activities. ADF and MCID, in particular, have only been working about one year, consequently their programs are nascent in comparison to the work of the other four USAID partners who have been in Angola considerably longer.
- Lack of trust within the Angolan society, which had a negative impact on interviews, particularly the focus group interviews. Individuals in the Angolan society are rightly fearful of disclosing information that could lead to their arrest. In an atmosphere where one is uncertain about what statements might be deemed inappropriate, silence is the safest response.
- Incomplete baseline data. MCID and PACT are the only USAID program partners that have collected data on intended audiences/beneficiaries before initiating activities. MCID, which commenced activities in 1998, did a quantitative survey of its intended audience/beneficiaries before initiating activities. PACT conducts appraisals of the capacity of NGOs before and after training. The data are useful in determining the degree to which each NGO has benefited from the training. However, it is problematic to extrapolate and measure the impact on broader society without a pretest of a broader audience such as the communities where the trained NGOs are active. USAID's partners have a number of anecdotal reports that reflect the successes of their individual programs. Where relevant we cite them.
- Limited quantitative data, particularly for gender issues or disaggregation of impacts by gender. Generally speaking, the program data kept by USAID-funded democracy and governance grantees is not as likely to be quantitative in nature as it is to be qualitative. This problem, which is recognized as being a common feature of

⁴ See sub-section 3.2, page 26 for discussion of IRI activities and importance thereof; additional reference to importance of work with political institutions is in sub-section 4.1.

democracy and governance programs, USAID-wide, was anticipated by the evaluation team. The absence of quantitative data on program performance is nonetheless a limitation.

Data on program listenership versus program listeners provides a good illustration of this problem in the USAID/Angola context. NDI broadcasts numerous radio programs on local radio. It is well known that 35% of households have radios, yet it is impossible to determine exactly how many people have listened to NDI broadcasts. The same is true of VOA broadcasts. The team received positive comments during interviews concerning the importance of VOA's independent broadcasts and the importance of NDI broadcasts for NGO training programs, but these testimonials do not tell us how many people listen and share these positive perceptions. At the impact level -- number of program listeners -- hard data do not exist, nor could they be easily or inexpensively collected.⁵

- Limited time available in Angola. An additional week in Luanda would have allowed the team time to check data sources, reconfirm information supplied by some informants and acquire local reaction to conclusions reached by the team prior to drafting the report.

Taken together these constraints had a cumulative impact on the evaluation. As noted in the discussion of the SOW and evaluation methods above, USAID/Angola was looking for answers to important program questions to emerge from an analysis of the activities of six implementing agencies -- or seven, if its relatively inter-agency agreement with the VOA is taken into account. With IRI in effect recusing itself from the evaluation process, NDI becoming an active participant only toward the end of the evaluation period, and ADF and MCDI having limited results to point to because of their late entry into the program, the study's findings and conclusions rest more heavily than is desirable on data about the activities initiated by PACT and World Learning. Nevertheless, with this context and set of limitations in mind, the evaluation team accepts responsibility for all errors or omissions.

II. Program Activities and Direct Results (Outputs)

This section outlines the activities of each of the key partners with which USAID is working to achieve its SO 2 level objectives. Almost invariably, the section subsumes a review of the most direct results (or outputs) of those activities. It is difficult, for example, to point out the workshops and training programs (activities) carried out by USAID's partners without at the same time alluding to the direct results (outputs) of those programs, e.g., numbers of NGOs trained. Accordingly, both are reviewed in this section, although its emphasis is on activities and

⁵ This is not to say that it is impossible to develop reliable estimates of radio program listenership and response. In Malawi, for example, USAID has collected data on the percentage of people who learn about family planning and other health care topics from the radio in its Demographic Health Survey (DHS).

the way in which they are intended to support the IRs that USAID’s hypothesized would lead to the achievement of SO 2. Table 1, below, provides a quick overview of how the activities of these intermediaries focus on specific Intermediate Results displayed on the SO 2 Framework shown in Figure 1 in the previous section.

Focus areas for partner activities, as shown below, are not intended to suggest that intermediaries are constrained to working in these areas. Some activities, such as NDI’s seven “Making Democracy Work” workshops, for example, can be viewed as having contributed to virtually all of the IRs. Similarly, while the VOA’s focus is on IR 2.3, the impact of what is transmitted through the media indirectly affects several other IRs for which bullets are not highlighted for this intermediary. When the bullets shown in Table 2 are understood as primary focus areas for partner activities what stands out is the strength of the program’s multi-partner concentration on certain IRs within the SO Results Framework, e.g., IR 2.2.

Table 1. Primary Focus of USAID Partner Activities in Support of SO 2

USAID SO 2 Program Partners	IR 1 Reconciliation Among Diverse Groups		IR 2 Citizens Exercise Democratic Rights and Responsibilities			IR 3 National Assembly and Local Governments More Accountable		IR 4 Strong basis for Free and Fair Elections
	IR 1.1 Leaders Respect For Human Rights Grows	IR 1.2 Citizens And CSOs Better Able to Resolve Disputes	IR. 2.1 Public Knows Its Rights, etc.	IR 2.2 Stronger CSO and Political Party Ability to Meet Member Needs	IR 2.3 Greater Free Flow of News and Views in Media	IR 3.1 N.A. and Political Parties Better Able to Represent Citizens	IR 3.2 Provincial and Local Govern- ments Able to Perform Roles	IR 4.1 Greater Party Capacity to Use Democratic Processes and Work across Party Lines
NDI	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	
IRI						◆		◆
PACT		◆	◆	◆				
WL	◆		◆		◆			
ADF		◆	◆	◆				
MDIC		◆	◆			◆		
VOA					◆			

What this table also highlights is the fact that the 1995 version of the Mission’s Results Framework did not explicitly focus on women’s participation in democratic processes and in governance. The lack of an explicit IR focus in this area (which the Mission has addressed in its 1998 revision of the Results Framework shown in Figure 2) does not mean that women have been ignored by USAID’s partners. Some partners, such as IRI have conducted special workshops on the role of women in democracy. Others have integrated women into their activities by including them in training programs, as is noted in the review of intermediary programs below, which focuses on all of the grantee/contractor intermediaries cited in Table 2.⁶

⁶ The Voice of America, which USAID has had an inter-agency agreement since, was not one of the programs on which the team focused directly.

Gender issues are also frequently a part of, or embedded in, other activities and outcomes. For example, a number of the collaborating NGOs have focused on human or civil rights. The specific issues they address include family issues such as health, child welfare, and domestic abuse. While NGOs may not explicitly state they are focused on gender, and data had not been collected by the NGO or the grantee as a gender-related activity, the activity does in fact address gender issues

A. National Democratic Institute (NDI)

The National Democratic Institute's multi year project, "Accountable, Democratic and Participatory Government," began in 1996 and runs through year 2000. NDI collaborates with other USAID-funded grantees, particularly PACT and MCID. It also collaborates with a number of government institutions, including the ministries of Justice and Public Administration, Office of the Attorney General, Supreme Court, various political parties, civic and professional associations, the media, the university, and NGOs. NDI's grant is for \$3.6 million.

The project seeks to support democratic processes in Angola and address some of the underlying causes of the ongoing conflict, including the lack of citizen participation in the political process, human rights abuses and widespread corruption. NDI has worked to achieve these objectives by promoting good governance programs (e.g., on corruption), civic education to encourage public participation in government processes, and by workshops designed to strengthen the National Assembly to counterbalance the dominant role of the executive branch of government.

As indicated in Table 1, NDI activities contribute IRs 1, 2 and 3. This has been achieved through three different components in the NDI program: civic education, constitutional revision and accountable governance.

Under its civic education program, NDI has supported or coordinated workshops on democracy, plays, radio programs, publications and other papers for public dissemination. Activities included:

- Workshop training on governance: 6,680 people from several NGOs in 408 groups were trained on issues related governance and democracy. Of this figure 1,523 or 23% of participants were women.
- "Training of Trainers" training: NDI held 6 TOT workshops in which 66 trainers participated, 21 or 32% of whom were women.
- Mass media programs: Fifty plays (15 broadcast on television) and more than 80 radio programs have been aired with assistance of NDI. NDI estimates that at least 5,000 people witnessed the plays not broadcast. The televised and radio broadcast programs potentially benefited respectively 9% and 35% of the population. In addition, NDI has distributed tapes and videos of plays and radio broadcasts.

NDI's second component on constitutional revision included:

- Seven workshops on Making Democracy Work. It included 650 individuals from government, civil society, and political parties.
- Its accountable governance component included the following activities:
- Three study tours to South Africa for 23 representatives from the National Assembly, government (national and provincial) and civil society.
- Local government seminars for 193 provincial and local administrators.
- Collaborative programs between INAP and NDI, with NDI assisting in curriculum and organizational development for training of local government administrators.
- Seminars on human rights for representatives of the National Assembly, government and civil society.
- Five debates on the ethics and transparency for representatives of the National Assembly, government and civil society.
- Seven workshops on the experiences with local government and human rights in different countries in Africa.
- Ten workshops focused on the judiciary, civil rights and decentralization for the Constitutional Commission. (See the Annex H for the NDI Data Sheet for additional information on NDI's objectives and accomplishments).

B. International Republican Institute (IRI)

As noted above, the evaluation team did not have direct contact with IRI during this evaluation. Accordingly, its summary of the IRI program is based on documents available at USAID/Angola and upon interviews with some participants in IRI-sponsored political party training workshops. The team also met with Angolan leaders, including legislators from five political parties.

IRI's multi year effort began in 1996 and has been extended to December 2000. The project seeks to enhance political leaders' understanding and acceptance of democratic ideals, build capacity of political parties, strengthen the National Assembly's institutional capacity and advance the national reconciliation process. IRI's grant has a total value of \$3.1 million.

As Table 1 indicates, IRI's project contributed IRs 3 and 4. Activities in support of these IRs included:

- Political Party Training. IRI conducted training workshops for each political party. A total of 1,500 individuals participated.
- Training for National Assembly Representatives. Training workshops were held for 81% or 180 of 220 delegates of the National Assembly.
- IRI also conducted a special workshop on the role of women in a democracy, in which 450 individuals participated.

While IRI staff reportedly moved throughout the country prior to a resumption of hostilities, most activities were directed at national-level political participants and processes in Luanda.

IRI's activities have been impacted by the resumption of hostilities. This impact has been different for IRI than for the other grantees. While the other grantees largest constraint has been security-related— limiting their access to provincial and local-level organizations, IRI's central constraint has been the failure of the peace process and the government of national unity. IRI's objectives were predicated upon the assumption that the peace process and national reconciliation would move forward.

Annex I has additional information on the IRI program.

C. Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT)

Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT) began its program in October 1996. Its general objectives are:

- Strengthen the role of civil society in Angola so that it gains the competency, legitimacy, and accountability to take on meaningful roles in the democratic and socio-economic development of the country; and
- Promote and strengthen strategic alliances between NGOs and other sectors in the country to foster participation of the non-governmental sector in the democratic and socio-economic development of the country.

USAID's funding of PACT activities has been \$3,600,278. It has also managed funds ranging from \$3,000 to \$50,000 from seven other sources, including Chevron and the World Bank.

PACT's primary contribution is to IR 2, as Table 1 suggests. PACT provides training to NGO officers in capacity building and a number of management topics, including governance and financial management. It helps NGOs define their members' and beneficiaries interests and needs and, in turn, involve their members and beneficiaries in defining and focusing their organization's strategic plans and in designing and implementing programs. PACT training aims at giving NGO members understanding of their democratic rights and responsibilities within the context of their NGO and NGO networks. This capacity building prepares NGO members to

exercise these rights and responsibilities. PACT has not maintained records on the number of women or women's issues involved in its NGO partners. The evaluation team, however, noted that many of the NGO recipients of PACT training are involved with issues affecting women and children. They also noted that some NGO leaders receiving PACT assistance were women.

PACT training is provided through both workshops and consultancies, as the following examples suggest:

- Through a National PACT Workshop, 43 Angolan NGOs and 11 International NGOs worked interactively to develop a "vision" for the Angolan NGO sector.
- Through PACT regional workshops in the Southern and Central regions, 87 Angolan NGOs worked on the development of NGO capacity and on approaches for building linkages between NGOs, government and donors.
- PACT provided training for 25 Angolan Trainers, many of whom were graduates of PACT training given in the program's first year, in subjects ranging from facilitation techniques, to strategic planning, fundraising, human resources management and business feasibility analysis.
- The Trainers trained by PACT led workshops in six provinces that provided local NGOs with training in the subjects these trainers had mastered through PACT's courses. A total of 62 NGOs participated in these provincial level sessions.
- PACT provided national level Angolan NGOs with a long term capacity building training program (of 9 logically sequenced workshops). In each of two years, 18 NGOs, or a total of 36 NGOs, completed in this program.
- In addition to training these 36 NGOs, PACT set up a mentoring arrangement for each one to help these organizations translate theory into practice.
- In addition, PACT provided 33 of the 36 with financial management consultancies.

PACT also emphasizes collaboration with other USAID programs working in the same field. Some examples of synergy with other NGO activities include PACT's training of:

- All but two of the NGOs for which World Learning provided training in human rights advocacy.
- MCID's lead partner in civic education.
- GAC, a partner of NDI in civic education.
- Some of ADF's partners are PACT graduates.
- Four of Catholic Relief Services' NGO partners in Emergency Preparedness.

- A number of the recipients of the US Embassy's Self-Help program funds.
- The Ministry of Planning has requested PACT to provide training to its staff in provinces and municipalities using PACT training manuals.

Additional material on PACT's program is to be found in the Annex J to this report.

D. World Learning

World Learning's multi year effort, "Angolan Civil Society Strengthening Project," began in 1996. The project seeks to strengthen civil society organizations, particularly human rights and media organizations. World Learning does this by providing grants and technical training to CSOs working in the human rights sector or on media issues. World Learning has a special role in human rights work in Angola. It is credited with the development of the country's first human rights project. World Learning collaborates with other USAID-funded grantees, particularly PACT, NDI and Christian Children's Fund. It also collaborates with UNAVEM, UNICEF and other bilateral donors. World Learning's IQC/Cooperative Agreement totals 2.1 million dollars.

As noted in Table 1, the focus of the World Learning program is on IRs 1 and 2. World Learning contributes to intermediate results through five complementary activities: human rights education training for CSOs focused on these issues, media technical training, grants to selected CSOs, short courses and study visits. For the two main components of the project, human rights education training and media technical training, a total of 868 people from 322 organizations (for an average of 3 people per organization) participated in training activities. The training activities have been carried out in six provinces: Luanda, Benguela, Bie, Huambo, Huila, and Cabinda.

Some of the activities carried out include:

- "Training of Trainers" training for 41 CSOs focused on human rights.
- Human rights education training for about 588 individuals from approximately 218 CSOs, 4 government ministries and 8 international organizations.
- Journalism training for independent media and government for approximately 22 participants in 13 organizations. The number of trained journalists represents 60% of working journalists in the independent media and 20% in the state media.
- NGO-Media relations training benefited 30 CSOs.
- 15 grants have been awarded to CSOs working on human rights issues.
- The human rights education training includes 30 "key" groups from 5 provinces that have participated in training exercises over a period of two years. All 30 organizations receive technical training in Luanda, and 15 receive small grants to

carry out activities. Eleven of the total group have also participated in TOT training. The balance of the CSOs trained have been part of a provincial-level replication process, conducted in coordination with World Learning and those who have participated in the TOT exercises.

A distinguishing factor differentiating World Learning from the other USAID program partners is the length of its training programs. World Learning training for CSOs consist of a series of workshops spanning two years. The same individuals from each CSO participate in each consecutive exercise. According to World Learning this has the benefit of reinforcing lessons learned and improves capacity for each CSO to independently carry out its objectives, rather than training exercises that last a shorter duration or that occur only once for each group of individuals.

- With regard to gender issues, World Learning notes:
- 30% of the CSOs receiving human rights education training include a focus exclusively on “women’s human rights issues,” while another 70% include programs focusing on “men and women’s human rights issues.”
- Thirty percent of human rights trainers are women, and 38% of individual participants in the training exercises are women.
- Of the journalists trained, 30% are women

Annex K to this report contains addition information on the World Learning project.

Like the other USAID program partners operating in Angola since 1996, World Learning’s work has been impacted by the resumption of hostilities. While World Learning has continued to work with representatives from six provinces (in some cases flying CSO trainees to Luanda), and makes site visits to all six provinces, they have been prevented from conducting any further replication exercises in at least two provinces, Bie and Huambo.

E. America’s Development Foundation (ADF)

ADF’s two-year effort in the “Increased Citizen Participation Project” seeks to support civil society organizations to develop organizational and technical skills, create public support, strengthen membership base, develop problem solving skills, create effective mechanisms and coalitions for working with local government, business and other sectors to solve their problems. ADF collaborates with other USAID-funded grantees, particularly PACT and MCID. It also collaborates with UNDP, ILO and the Government of Angola through the Ministry of Education. ADF’s two year grant is 1.07 million dollars.

ADF’s project contributes most heavily to IR 2 with some anticipated effects on IR 1 as well, as Table 1 indicates. This project intends to achieve its results through advocacy training, funding advocacy campaigns and coalition building with and among other groups working on

transformation of the relations between civil society and government. ADF employs a six-step process:

- Outreach (ADF identifies issues and contacts Angolan groups to offer assistance on advocacy).
- Trainees Identified.
- Advocacy Training.
- Advocacy Campaign Planned, with the technical assistance of ADF.
- Advocacy Campaign Conducted, with ADF financial assistance of up to \$20,000.

ADF's program did not begin until September 1998, and then suffered administrative setbacks until about June 1999. Thereafter the program has noticeably increased the pace of its activities and has accomplished the following:⁷

- Trained its own advocacy training team in which approximately 30 individuals benefited.
- Worked with 15 civic associations, two of which represent an additional 80 CSOs.
- Conducted two courses on advocacy for 60 individuals (30 in each course) in two provinces (Huila and Namibe).
- Conducted a third, more advanced, course on advocacy in Luanda in which 15 individuals participated; and
- Awarded advocacy grants to three associations to conduct campaigns. One grant went to a coalition of 61 CSOs in Luanda, while a second included 20 different CSOs in Luanda.

ADF's representative intends to include government representatives in advocacy training workshops.⁸ Local and national government officials have inquired about this possibility, and when the team discussed this with NGOs in focus groups, its interlocutors welcomed the idea. They felt it would create opportunities for government officials to better understand the context in which advocacy campaigns are developed, launched, and managed. Participation by

⁷ An unintended result of the evaluation team's visit to Namibe and Lubango presented ADF with an opportunity to meet and possibly recruit numerous NGO and CSO groups already involved with World Learning, PACT or MCID.

⁸ The ADF representative was under the impression that inclusion of government representatives was not possible. However, after consultations with his home office, this was cleared up. In fact, ADF has encouraged the representative to include work with government officials.

government in relevant programs could diffuse the traditional tensions that emerge around “advocacy” between government and civil society and encourage more productive responses by government to advocacy campaigns. The Annex L to this report contains additional information on the ADF program.

ADF’s project has been constrained by the resumption of hostilities; however, given the late start in implementation of the project it does not appear that ADF has been forced to redefine or re-allocate resources, or has experienced any substantial losses in effort or resources.

F. Mississippi Consortium for International Development (MCID)

MCID’s two-year effort, “Grassroots Civic and Political Education Program,” seeks to increase citizen participation in the political and governance processes at the grassroots and provincial levels of society. Its activities seek to increase citizens’ awareness of their duties, rights and responsibilities; and increase government officials’ understanding of their duties and responsibility in responding to citizens demands and needs. MCID collaborates with other USAID-funded grantees, including ADF and NDI. Main Angolan collaborators are AAD, ADRA, Ministry of Education, National Institute for Public Administration (INAP) and Agostinho Neto University (ANU). MCID’s two year grant is for \$1.6 million.

MCID’s work contributes to IRs 1, 2 and 3, as Table 1 indicates. It intends to achieve its objectives largely through civic and political education programs.

- MCID is currently in negotiations with the Ministry of Education to develop programs in Luanda and other provinces where MCID is able to work.
- MCID conducted a baseline survey prior to initiating its program. The survey pretests basic public knowledge, attitudes and practices with respect to democracy, the peace process, and political and economic reform policies. It was carried out in April 1999.⁹ One thousand individuals in four provinces (Bengo, Benguela, Huila and Kwanza Sul) were surveyed. MCID is in the process of analyzing the data gathered. A survey is planned at the end of proposed activities to measure the program’s impact.
- In collaboration with Agostinho Neto University (ANU) and USIS, MCID conducted three short-term training workshops in three Provinces, Huila, Benguela and Bengo. Seventy-six individuals from municipal and provincial government participated. Of the participants only three were women. MCID is developing a partnership with ANU to create a faculty of Public Administration and Political Science.

The Annex M to this report provides further detail on the MCID effort.

⁹ The survey was designed, tested and implemented between October 1998 and April 1999.

MCID is on schedule with its project. Despite the resumption in hostilities and the limitations this has created, MCID does not appear to have been forced to redefine or reallocate resources.

III. Program Outcomes

Program outcomes, in the sense the MSI team is using that word in this evaluation, focus on what happens as a result of the activities and outputs (direct results) of the kinds of efforts that USAID's partners make in support of a Strategic Objective. Results at this level consider, for example, what happens inside the civil society organizations (CSOs) USAID's partners trained after, or as a result of that training. The same would be true for government entities, political parties and citizens -- what happens in each of these focus populations after partner activities are completed?

In effect, these are the core questions USAID raised in its SOW:

- Are the activities leading to the achievement of the strategic objective?
- What have Angolan organizations and institutions gained from USAID's DG assistance?
- What have Angolans gained from USAID's DG assistance?

Through the first of these question, USAID focuses on the logic of its Results Framework, in effect asking whether direct results of activities are, in the predicted manner, leading to the realization of its IRs and SO 2. The second and third questions ask about the intended beneficiaries of USAID's program. Inherently, these questions are somewhat redundant, since USAID's IRs are stated in terms of outcomes at the organizational and individual (or beneficiary) level in Angola. Recognizing this redundancy, the MSI has incorporated, where relevant, information about beneficiary outcomes in its discussion, below, of the first of these three questions. Following that presentation, the team returns to SOW questions 2 and 3 to provide a summary view of what the evidence shows on both of these issues, drawing upon evidence that has already been laid out in the course of the team's effort to respond to the first of the SOW's three questions.

Prior to turning to its findings on the SOW's three core questions, it is important to note, somewhat redundantly, three factors that complicated the teams efforts:

- The limited involvement of some of USAID's key partners in the evaluation process and the relatively short time during which several of its partner programs have been in operations;
- The resumption of hostilities in Angola which have brought into questions key assumptions in the SO 2 Results Framework, and

- Problems that stem from the SO 2 Results Framework itself and from the baseline and monitoring efforts for this program prior to the evaluation.


As noted above, USAID/Angola's programs in both the democracy and governance field and in other sectors has been affected by the resumption of hostilities. USAID/Angola's SO 2, *Increased National Reconciliation through Strengthening Civil Society and Political Institutions*, is part of USAID's strategy, adopted in 1995, to support Angola's transition from crisis to peace, democracy and economic recovery. The original strategy assumed that the Lusaka peace process would continue. The resumption of war in late 1998 invalidated this assumption. However, the fact that many of the activities aimed at achieving this objective involve work with community groups and individuals—building from the bottom up—has allowed work to strengthen civil society and political institutions to proceed without significant change (except in the parts of the country where security conditions do not permit safe access).

Grantee work with political institutions was adapted to the conditions brought about by the resumption of war and the interruption of the Lusaka peace process. Specifically, after the split in UNITA over the issue of whether the party's representatives should continue to participate in the Government of National Reconciliation and Unity (GURN), those legislators and others who remained with Savimbi no longer participated in reconciliation activities. Also, travel and work in the UNITA controlled areas became impossible for grantees' expatriate staff.

Grantees working primarily with NGOs were able to continue more or less the same activities that they were doing before the conflict resumed. Their main limitation was geographical. However, by adjusting their efforts to work through trained nationals they have been able to conduct activities in a number of interior cities such as Huambo, Bie, and Benguela province even though expatriate staff do not now travel to these areas. A full range of activities has been possible for grantees work in Luanda and in Huila and Namibe provinces.

Team efforts to answers USAID questions about program outcomes in relation to SO 2 and its IRs were also affected by certain aspects of the Results Framework the Mission developed and by the absence of adequate performance indicators and baseline data. Results Framework issues that warrant a brief review in this regard include:

- SO 2 itself is not a single result. It includes three different results: *Increased national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and (strengthened) political institutions*, as the diagram below indicates.



- USAID/Angola has not operationally defined success or formally monitored (through its R4s) any indicators that directly measure these outcomes. Performance measures established by the Mission are all at the IR level.

-- With respect to *national reconciliation*, the resumption of hostilities *prima facie* evidence of a lack of success. However, had there not been a resumption of hostilities, determining whether this aspect of SO 2 had been achieved would have been difficult in the absence of a baseline or standard against which to measure progress.

-- Similarly, the absence of a baseline or standard against which to judge progress for either the *civil society strengthened* or *political institutions strengthened* aspect of SO2 is problematic.

- Several of the IRs that support SO 2 also include more than one result, e.g.:

-- IR 1.1 *Increased capacity of (select) national, provincial **and** local political and administrative leadership to respect human rights **and** promote national reconciliation.*

-- IR 3.1 *Improved Capacity of Parliamentarians **and** Political Parties to Assume Legislative Responsibilities **and** Represent Citizens Interests.*

These compound objectives require USAID not only to be successful with all aspects of an IR to say it was achieved, they imply the need for multiple baselines and/or standards against which to assess performance.

- At the IR level, USAID did not specify independent measures of performance. Rather, its R4s listed the status of sub-IRs, calling them performance indicators, e.g.:

Strategic Objective # 2: Increase national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions
Result Name: Citizens exercise their democratic rights and responsibilities
Performance Indicator: Strengthened capacity of civil society organizations and political parties to respond to members needs and represent their interests
Unit of Measure/Indicator Description: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number of citizens initiatives on what is learned through civic education - Citizens reporting increased understanding of their rights and responsibilities in a democracy

The problem here is that, under USAID's guidance for the development of Results Frameworks and performance measures, one cannot use "if" to prove "then", i.e., a

lower level result that is necessary if a higher level result is to be achieved cannot be used to prove that the higher level result was achieved.¹⁰ For this particular evaluation, the impact of not having well established independent measures at the IR level for the Mission's program meant that the team had to infer what might constitute success rather than assess it against stated expectations.

- At the level it designated "unit of measure/indicator description" in its R4s, USAID Angola suggested ways of measuring performance that are not always feasible or appropriate to the objective to which they are linked. As a result, the evaluation team was not able to rely on the Mission's on going monitoring system for data support as it initiated the evaluation. Table 2 presents a summary of the kinds of performance measures found under sections of the Missions FY1997 and FY2000 R4s.

With these caveats in mind, we turn to the evidence the evaluation found in relation to the SOW's core questions.

A. Are Activities Leading to the Achievement of the Strategic Objective?

As noted above, USAID's SO 2 objective actually incorporates three intended results: national reconciliation, strengthened civil society and strengthened political institutions, with the expectation that the latter two of these results would lead to or bring about the first.

National reconciliation has not been achieved, as is patently apparent. Hostilities resumed in 1998 persist today, with no end in sight. USAID/Angola has itself said that the reality of resumed hostilities has so changed the environment in which it is operating as to require the Mission to redefine its Country Strategy. For SO2, it has judged the possibility of elections to be so remote that it has, in effect, suspended IR 4 from its effort in this area.

For USAID and for this evaluation, this change in circumstances clearly suggests that the program hypothesis that improvements in civil society and political institutions while perhaps *necessary*, are not *sufficient*, to bring about national reconciliation. The implication for SO2 -- and for the Mission more broadly, in that case, is that some other, as yet unidentified result or set of results, beyond those contemplated by SO 2 and USAID's other SOs, are required to bring peace and stability to the country, as the figure below suggests.

¹⁰ For example, if *seeds planted* is a necessary lower level result to achieve increased production of maize, it is not acceptable to use "seed planted" as a measure of production. Production must be measured independently, e.g., volume or value of maize per unit land.

Table 1. USAID Performance Measures for IRs Under SO2, from the FY97 R4

(✓✓ indicates that these indicators are still monitored and appear in the Mission's FY2000 R4)

IR 1: Reconciliation among diverse groups of Angolans emerge.

Subordinate IRs and Performance Indicators

- 1.1 Increased capacity of leadership to respect human rights and promote national reconciliation (*Unit of Measure: Number of participants in fora for open dialogue held at local, provincial or national level which brings together diverse participants.*)
- 1.2 Increased capacity of citizens and civil society organizations to resolve disputes peacefully and effectively. (*Unit of Measure: Number of reported citizen initiatives on dispute resolution*) ✓✓

IR 2: Citizens exercise their democratic rights and responsibilities

Subordinate IRs and Performance Indicators

- 2.1 Increased public understanding of rights and responsibilities of citizens (*Unit of Measure: Number of times CSOs participate in policy formulation at all levels of government*)
- 2.2 Strengthened capacity of civil society organizations and political parties to respond to members needs and represent their interests (*Unit of Measure: Number of citizens initiatives on what's learned through civic education -- citizens reporting increased understanding of their rights and responsibilities in a democracy*) ✓✓
- 2.3 Greater free flow of information from independent news sources (*Unit of Measure: Number of listenenership*) ✓✓

IR 3: Facilitate accountable governance with parliament and 3 key provincial administrations


Subordinate IRs and Performance Indicators

- 3.1 Improved capacity of parliamentarians and political parties to assume legislative responsibilities and represent citizens' interests (*Unit of Measure: Number of trained parliamentarians and members of political parties -- understanding by Parliament and political parties of basic democratic values*) ✓✓
- 3.2 In key provinces, improved capacity of provincial and local administrators to perform their roles consistent with the Lusaka Protocol and respond to citizens (*Unit of Measure: Number of administrators responding to citizens needs -- working groups or other structures within a given provincial department to facilitate integration*)

IR 4: Strengthen the foundation for participation in free, fair and peaceful elections

Subordinate IRs and Performance Indicators

- 4.1 Enhance political party capability to understand democratic processes and work across party lines (*Unit of Measure: Number of political parties capacitated to understand democratic processes and work across party lines -- improved organization of political parties*)



Recognizing that national reconciliation clearly depends upon more than simply improvements in civil society and political institutions, it is, nonetheless, relevant to ask whether USAID's program for SO 2 achieved these more limited objectives.

(1) Strengthened Civil Society

Even in the absence of an explicit performance measure that defines what USAID intended by the term "strengthened civil society" (independent of the kinds of changes its IRs were to bring about), an increase in the numbers of NGOs in a country like Angola constitutes reasonably strong evidence of a strengthening of civil society.

The evaluation team was not able to find baseline data on the number of NGOs in Angola prior to 1996. Nevertheless, the team was told by multiple sources that few if any were in operation before 1996 and now that number is burgeoning. Of the few that existed in 1995, only a couple were reportedly working on democracy and governance issues. At that time, civic organizations working on governance issues tended to focus on local level communities, rather than activities directed at national or provincial level institutions. The exact number of NGOs operating in Angola today is not known. What is known, however, is that 400 NGOs are registered. If reports of the degree to which this sector has grown in the past five years can be trusted, success in this area -- by this single measure -- has been significant.

As to popular and governmental response to the increase in the number of NGOs in Angola, reports received by the team suggest that actions to strengthen civil society have received enthusiastic support from the population and have been accepted by government authorities.

(2) Strengthened Political Institutions

Political institutions, in the sense in which USAID/Angola has used this term subsumes both the formal institutions of government at the national, provincial and local levels and also the country's political parties. In the absence of clear performance indicators for this objective, the evaluation team sought out information about positive changes in the way these institutions operated.

By and large, reports made to the evaluation team about the status of political institutions in Angola failed to suggest that positive changes have occurred over the past few years. In the absence of a baseline on these institutions it is, however, difficult to determine whether negative comments about the operation of some of these institutions means that no change has occurred or that the situation used to be even worse. Among the reports that the team received from multiple sources which suggest little if any change in governmental institutions were the following:

- The legislative branch of government remains weak and ineffectual.
- The National Assembly has not been able to make the government more accountable or transparent in any measurable way.
- Most legislation originates in the executive branch. The balance of power has not tipped from the executive in favor of a more equal distribution of power between the legislative and executive branches of government (let alone involving the judicial branch).
- Parliamentarians of the opposition parties have no office space or support staff, whereas the MPLA deputies can use office space in the large MPLA headquarter building.
- Angola's justice system is still weak. People in general do not have confidence in it.

On the positive side:

- IRI documents suggest that there has been an improvement in the quality of debate in the National Assembly.

With respect to political parties:

- Two of Angola's political parties reported that they undertook to reorganize and strengthen themselves following the training they received from IRI.
- Both the PLD and Social Renovation Party (PRS) claimed to have more representation in interior towns than they had for the 1992 elections.
- The team found no evidence that parties, particularly the MPLA and UNITA, are using more participatory techniques.
- It did note that the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) had several women, including its President, in its leadership.
- There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the two major parties have included more women in their political structures as a result of the program.

(3) Results at the IR Level

Below the SO level, where limited evidence about change over the period during which the SO 2 program has been in operation, lie the four IRs on which activities carried out by the Mission's implementing partners focused. In the paragraphs below, evidence the team found of change at the IR level is reviewed.

(a) IR 1. Reconciliation Opportunities Among Diverse Groups of Angolans Emerge

This IR, as noted above, is supported by two lower level IRs:

- IR 1.1 Increased Capacity of (select) National, Provincial and Local Political and Administrative Leadership to Respect Human Rights and Promote National Reconciliation
- IR 1.2 Increased Capacity of Citizens and CSOs to Resolve Disputes Peacefully and Effectively

Among USAID's implementing partners, World Learning has been most heavily involved in IR 1.1 work that promotes human rights. NDI has also worked in this area. On IR 1.2, the key players have been NDI and PACT, and more recently ADF and MDIC.

On the human rights side, information gathered from and about World Learning's program suggests that there have been some significant results. Examples of outcomes that suggest an increased concern for and capacity to act to ensure human rights include the following:

- The number of government authorities at national, provincial and local levels that took corrective action (such as releasing people held in prison without charges) after participating in World Learning training exercises jumped from three in 1998 to twenty-six in 1999. Eighty prisoners in Huambo and fifty in Huila were released.
- A public demonstration in Benguela against the conscription of boys under the age of 18 into the military forced provincial government to halt the conscription practice.
- With the assistance of World Learning-trained CSOs, rural women have recently had success in persuading/forcing government to grant land rights to women and forced landowners to pay higher wages for daily agricultural labor.
- Women traders in Huila, after training by World Learning, learned about their civil rights and, as a result successfully discouraged or limited police from harassing them. Since training began, these women reported a 40% decrease in police harassment.
- A World Learning-trained CSO created the first school in the country designed for street children, many of whom had previously been jailed.

Focus groups of beneficiaries confirmed that their participation in USAID-sponsored training had generated greater interest in human and civil rights issues, and particularly raised their level of awareness relating to women's issues (in labor, agriculture, health, child welfare, domestic abuse, etc.). Other NGOs and CBOs revealed in focus groups their work with USAID grantees had stimulated their interest in gender issues. World Learning reported 30% of CSOs receiving human rights education training focused exclusively on "women's human rights issues, while 70% included programs focused on "men and women's human rights issues." Frequently they referred to "human rights" issues when they were speaking about civil rights, agriculture, health, child care, etc. These issues appear to be the focus of attention of NGOs rather than human rights in the more narrow sense of government violations. In the current political climate very few organizations are aggressively working on traditionally-defined human rights violations.

NDI, which was also active in this area, supported seminars on human rights for National Assembly, civil society and government representatives, but comparable outcome level data stemming from these efforts was not provided to the evaluation team, nor did the interviews the team conducted suggest visible outcome level from this NDI work. On the other hand, during interviews with beneficiaries and focus groups, the team learned that NDI activities brought disparate groups, including government representatives, together for dialogue on issues. Improved communication resulted. Local administrators reported that they improved their capacity to respond to emergency and security needs of the population

As suggested above, the evaluation team took note, during the course of this evaluation, of the way in which "human rights" issues are being defined by CSOs and other organizations in Angola. When speaking about human rights issues, very few people interviewed made reference to traditional human rights subjects such as violence committed against individuals and/or civil society by government institutions or individuals employed by government. Civil rights or humanitarian issues, such as a weak or non-functioning judiciary, violence against women by husbands, or food insecurity were often mentioned as human rights issues. In reporting on this issue, the team felt it necessary to highlight this difference, to avoid misinterpretation.¹¹

As to evidence of greater use of dispute resolution processes that do not involve conflict, evidence available to the evaluation team was at best indirect. Human rights outcomes achieved by organizations assisted by World Learning were, for example, achieved without conflict, even though they often involved difficult issues. The most pertinent example, in this regard, being the use of peaceful public demonstration tactics to achieve a positive human rights outcome.¹²

¹¹ For the same reason, USAID and its implementing partners may find it useful to develop a more nuanced definition to capture the concept and at the same time more clearly desegregate between groups that are focused on human rights issues, as traditionally defined, and those that are focusing on this broader set of civil rights or humanitarian issues.

¹² The paucity of this kind of outcome information -- and contrasting availability of information on numbers of people trained -- from virtually all of USAID's partners suggests an inadequate degree of focus on outcomes in the monitoring systems of these organizations.

(b) IR 2: Citizens Exercise their Democratic Rights and Responsibilities

This IR, as noted above, is supported by three lower level IRs:

- IR 2.1 Increased Public Understanding of their Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens in a Democracy and Appropriate Channels (both Government and non-government) for the Representation of Citizen Interests
- IR 2.2 Strengthened Capacity of CSOs (Service Delivery, Advocacy and Watchdog) and Political Parties to Respond to Members Needs and Represent their Interests to Relevant Authorities
- IR 2.3 Greater Free Flow of Information from Independent News Sources

Under this IR, all of the partner implementing agents play a direct role in producing results. NDI, PACT, World Learning, ADF and MDIC are all involved in efforts to increase citizen's understanding of their rights. NDI, PACT and ADF are also engaged in efforts to strengthen the capacity of NGOs. As to improving the flow of information, NDI and World Learning both play a role as does VOA.

There is no valid way to determine whether public knowledge and understanding of citizen rights and responsibilities changed between 1995 and the time of this evaluation. No baseline data on this subject existed against which to compare the situation in 1999. USAID is in the process of correcting this problem. MDIC has as one of its responsibilities the development of baseline data on this question. Its survey, which was completed in 1999 and should soon be available will establish a point from which change can be measured going forward. Unfortunately, this did not help the team with its efforts to determine what changes may have occurred between 1995 and the point in time on which MDIC data will comment.

As to changes in the capacity of Angolan NGOs, the data situation is somewhat better, particularly for those organizations assisted by PACT.

- Using its Organizational Capacity Assessment Tool (OCAT), PACT has conducted "before and after" analysis of various components of management for the first 14 of a core group of 33 NGOs trained during year one. The analysis showed overall management improvement of 44% and 82% improvement in financial management. PACT expects even better results from the second group as that group has benefited from an enhanced mentorship component.
- Pre and post-training evaluations show 59% improvement in NGOs' beneficiary needs assessments and integration into NGO planning process, 95% improvement in NGO inclusion of beneficiaries in NGO mission and strategy review, 72% improvement in diversifying donor contacts, and 31% improvement in NGO relationships with government.

- PACT's 36 primary NGO beneficiaries have a total of 2,048 members and have reached over 131,000 beneficiaries. Its secondary (replication) NGOs have 5,256 members and have reached over 525,000 beneficiaries.
- The Portuguese language curriculum developed by PACT on nine NGO management topics, in addition to being used by PACT's and replication trainers, have been circulated widely for use by national and international NGOs and government for training local officials. These are regarded as the standard for these topics in Angola.
- Donors use participation in PACT's workshops as criterion for providing funding to NGOs.

PACT views its capacity building activities with NGOs as providing the foundation for effective management, an essential input, for success of programs being implemented by other of USAID's SO2 partners, each of which are more tightly focused on such things as advocacy, human rights promotion, the media, and civic education. Direct measurement of that improvement is partly satisfied through the kinds of pre-and post testing PACT has carried out. Indirect measures, such as the willingness of other organizations to define PACT's training as the standard or as a prerequisite for funding is perhaps even stronger evidence that management improvements do indeed result from the training and mentoring this organization provides.

While the sort of management measures PACT has incorporated into its training for CSOs are equally relevant for the government authorities on which NDI has focused and the political parties on which IRI focuses, they do not exist. Nor do PACT's own measures fully address the kinds of change in which USAID is interested (i.e., changes in service delivery, advocacy and watchdog functions). Notable also is the fact that newer programs such as ADF's advocacy training also seem to lack systems for measuring outcome level change. ADF is, however, keeping track of requests for advocacy training, which it says are rising and include a number of government entities. Properly quantified, demand is a potentially useful measure of the perceived utility and indirectly of peer comments on the actual utility of such training.

Absent the kinds of measures or some other form of baseline on the specific aspects of CSOs and other organizations that USAID is interested in seeing change, it is extremely difficult to ascertain whether such changes have taken place. What evaluation teams like this one are more likely to learn is whether organizations remember receiving training from a particular organization and whether they appreciated it. Pinpointing changes that result from training is often difficult, although the aforementioned decisions that two political parties recalled making following IRI training to reorganize themselves is a welcome exception to this rule.

Another type of information that suggests that training has been effective is data that suggests that entities that have received the kinds of training that PACT, World Learning and the other USAID partners have provided to CSOs in Angola is information about actions these organizations have taken which were not plausible in the absence of such training. For Angola's CSOs collaboration on issues may well be such an example. In their training programs, USAID partners have encouraged Angolan civic organizations to network and develop coalitions. One example of this was provided by members of a focus group in Lubango, who described how several NGOs had acted together in approaching the local government on a health issue.

The free flow of information is a major focus for NDI and VOA and has also received attention from World Learning. Broadly speaking, individuals in all sectors reported to the evaluation team that there has been an increase in the number of radio and television programs, and printed media articles questioning the war and government policy. Two groups are circulating petitions calling for peace. While the latitude journalists have is reportedly greater than it was several years ago, there are limits which, if crossed, bring arrest.¹³ The important point to keep in mind is that it appears that the boundaries for independent media reporting are expanding due to increased boldness of journalists and the Government's growing sensitivity to criticism for repressing journalists.

What is known in this area is the number and types of broadcasts and other forms of information dissemination that are occurring, as described in the previous section's discussion of NDI and WL, and to some degree in the team's limited discussions with VOA staff during the evaluation. What is less well understood is how extensively and intensively this output is being listened to by Angola's citizens. NDI has data on the attendees for the thirty-five plays it has put on which were not televised, i.e., about 5,000 people watched. For broadcasts, and for the 15 plays NDI televised, however, it is more difficult to tell how big a audience NDI and VOA supported programs have, or how that audience reacts to this programming. The potential radio audience is reportedly about 35% of the population. For television, the comparable figure is 9%. These represent the potential audience for broadcasts such as those of NDI's plays, but the actual audience for both television and radio audiences remains unknown. In addition, for NDI's plays there is an additional undefined number of people who have benefited from these programs via the distribution of video and cassettes tapes, and printed material.

Some movement has been made in the direction of gathering more reliable information about audience size and preferences, but it may not yet be adequate to provide useful feed back to USAID's partners. Specifically, a poll taken two years ago indicated that VOA had more listeners than BBC. This poll, which the evaluation team did not review in detail, has potential as a baseline for future analysis, particularly if it tracked listenership for specific types of VOA programs and provided numeric audience estimates as well as comparative data.

During its own interviews, the evaluation team acquired information that was similar to that generated by the poll mentioned above, but lacks its statistical foundation. Of the local media, Radio Ecclesias, the team was told, has a reputation for reporting news truthfully even when its reporting draws disapproval from the Government. Concerning VOA, the team's interlocutors reported that people listen to it, along with Radio Icclesias, for information about events in Angola and elsewhere that media controlled or influenced by the Angolan Government do not report. The American Ambassador's attention to, and or visits to, key organizations such as Radio Icclesia reportedly have an important positive impact in encouraging independent action and solidarity among groups under pressure by the government.

¹³ Government reaction has been inconsistent, i.e., in some cases journalists are detained and questioned. In other instances journalists whose criticisms seem just a serious escape with no harassment.

(c) IR 3: Facilitate Accountable Governance within Parliament and 3 Provincial Administrations

This IR, as noted above, is supported by three lower level IRs:

- IR 3.1: Improved Capacity of Parliamentarians and Political Parties to Assume Legislative Responsibilities and Represent Citizen Interests
- In Key Provinces, Improved Capacity of Provincial and Local Administrations to Perform their Roles Consistent with the Lusaka Protocol and Respond to Citizens

NDI, IRI, World Learning and MDIC are the partner organizations most involved with IR 3.1, with NDI also playing the lead role for IR 3.2. While it is relatively easy to document the activities these entities have undertaken, as was done in Section II, the task of measuring outcomes for these results is much more difficult. Capacity is not something you can measure directly with any ease. Capacity, in organizations is like attitudes held by people -- the impact of this potential on behavior is enormous, but until organizations or people act, it is often hard to tell what their attitudes and capacities are. Training tells you what was provided, but not what was absorbed or accepted, so training too is deficient as a way of knowing about capacity. As a result, organizations like USAID and teams like our own must rely upon the judgements of entities that are in close contact with the organizations in question. For this reason, the evaluation team's inability to talk with IRI representative and our limited access to NDI staff made an assessment of performance in this area particularly difficult. MDIC, on the other hand, did participate in the evaluation process, but the newness of its program was a constraint.

As a result, the MSI team found itself driven back to evidence at the "behavior" level for these organizations (as reported above for SO 2 under (2) Strengthened Political Organizations). Data at that level, which indicated little change in the way the National Assembly operates that new capacity, if it exists, is not being fully utilized.

Separately, the team tried to determine if there was an increase in constituent outreach by deputies of the National Assembly, but little data were available. NDI and IRI have established relations with national-level government and the legislature, and IRI has worked extensively with political parties. During the team's discussion with parliamentarians who participated in training, some showed awareness of the importance of communication between deputies and their constituents. This awareness was also evident in the conversations in the meetings the team had with leaders of political parties. For example, as reported above, the PLD reported that they have expanded their representation and activities in the provinces. We were unable to verify increased activities at local levels by parties or deputies. Anecdotally, we heard complaints in the provinces that the legislators who supposedly were representing them rarely visited their localities.

With respect to provincial and local governments, World Learning is working with provincial level government in six provinces. PACT and ADF have established relations with provincial governments in at least three provinces. Local governments in Lubango and Namibe appear responsive to dialogue and pressure from NGOs, and have engaged members of the civil society in discussions about social and economic problems. The governors of Huila and Namibe

both expressed interest to members of the evaluation team concerning activities of local NGOs, and even expressed the hope that local NGOs dealing with displaced persons and children would receive additional funding.

Demand is a useful indirect measure of the degree to which organizations value the kinds of services program intermediaries provide even in the absence of data on the impact of those services. For this IR, changes in the flow of services to the National Assembly were noted for the evaluation team by those it interviewed. Of particular note is the fact that several political party representatives complained about the decline in activities with political institutions following the departure of IRI's resident representative. UNITA *Renovada* legislators complained that following their decision to stay in the National Assembly despite Savimbi's call for all UNITA legislators to leave Luanda, IRI had avoided contact with them. IRI may have another perspective on this but as the team was not able to interview IRI representatives, we have no confirmation of that. The one thing that does seem clear -- no matter how IRI views this situation -- is that those who had previously received assistance from the organization noticed its absence, which in the absence of any other evidence suggests that those who noticed found some value in what they could no longer access.

(d) IR4: Strengthen the Foundation for Citizens and Political Parties to Participate in Free, Fair and Peaceful Elections

This IR was supported by one lower level IR:

- IR 1.1 Enhanced Political Party Capacity to Understand Democratic Processes and Work Across Party Lines

IRI is the only one of USAID's intermediaries that focused on this IR, which, as noted above, USAID has suspended as a function of the changes in the political environment in Angola. Nevertheless, the question of whether the program was effective at the sub-IR level may be pertinent in the future for USAID, and is worth examining. As noted above, all of the team's information about IRI's work is "second-hand." In addition, it is largely of a testimonial nature. The team's interlocutors generally spoke of the strong impact of IRI's activities while it had a resident representative in Angola. Political party leaders spoke positively about the former IRI resident representative and reported that the activities undertaken by IRI during the tenure of a resident representative had been helpful. While these reports do not demonstrate enhanced capacity, they are -- in the absence of hard evidence of work across party lines and behavioral evidence of a better understanding of the democratic process -- they at least indicate that IRI was developing the kinds of relationships with parties that would provide a basis for effective change oriented training.

The negative impact of a perceived decrease in program support opposition parties could well be in their lessened ability to provide articulate alternative policies to those of the MPLA or otherwise critically review the performance of the Government. Opposition parties reported to the evaluation team that they lack trained personnel and resources, including office space and equipment, staff, etc. IRI's work with them has contributed to their development and both Parliamentarians and political party complained that the absence of a resident IRI had brought about a decline support for their development.

(e) Comparisons Among Partner Programs

In its SOW, USAID asked the evaluation team to make comparisons where possible on the effectiveness of different strategies implemented by different partner organizations. In principle, such comparisons should be possible for those lower level IRs on which more than one organization is focusing, e.g., World Learning and NDI have both focused on increasing respect for human rights.

In order to make the kinds of comparisons the Mission requested, equivalent information would need to be available from all of the organizations working on a particular sub-IR. In practice, this simply didn't occur in this evaluation. Comparisons between newer and older programs, e.g., between PACT and ADR, which are both working on improving the capacity of CSOs, are inherently problematic. In Angola, the newer programs, with the possible exception of VOA, are so much newer than the old programs that this, plus their lack of reportable outcomes, made such comparisons moot. Comparisons between programs of equivalent duration offer better prospects, yet in this evaluation, that kind of data did not exist. On human rights, for example, the team's interactions with the World Learning staff were of longer duration than was the case with NDI. In reporting out the study data, the team -- and the reader -- can both see that the study presents more outcome data for World Learning than for NDI. Yet the case cannot be made that this means that World Learning's outcomes were more extensive or significant relative to the activities it took to produce them. The fact is that for NDI and IRI, the evaluation team simply has less information than it does on PACT and World Learning. As a result, the kinds of comparisons suggested in the SOW are simply not prudent.

(f) Summary of Program Results in Terms of USAID's SO and IRs

At the SO level, MSI's analysis is consistent with the Mission's own assessment with respect to the objective of *increased national reconciliation*. While it may have seemed reasonable in 1995 that this would occur, given positive donor encouragement, in retrospect, it may be an objective that could not be achieved simply by providing a foreign assistance program, no matter how well thought out that program might have been.¹⁴ The collapse of Angola's unsteady political truce, by extension, is not the fault of a failed foreign assistance effort.

On the other hand, the lower level elements of USAID/Angola's SO2, i.e., *civil society strengthened* and *political institutions strengthened*, on the other hand, are objectives that are plausibly realized as a result of donor assistance.

Evidence from this evaluation, which has a number of serious limitations, nonetheless suggests that USAID's SO 2 program has had a more significant impact on Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) than it has had on government operations and political parties. In this regard several things are worth noting:

¹⁴ For example, were a USAID/Kosovo country program to emerge and state as its SO something like "Harmony Achieved between the Ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo" it would probably be challenged as being beyond what an aid program is likely to accomplish. SOs that focused on institutions functioning, economy rebuilt, etc., would be more likely to be considered achievable.

- The momentum now evident in Angola's NGO sector may not be fully attributable to USAID's program, but the development of the sector has clearly benefited from its presence.¹⁵
- Differences between the program's impact on CSOs and political parties is greater than it might have been had hostilities not resumed. Positive reports about changes that political parties made and evidence of a continuing demand (appreciation) for the assistance the program had begun to provide to these organizations is equivalent to, but not as strong as similar evidence amassed about CSOs.
- Differences between the program's impact on CSOs and government operations do not seem attributable solely to Angola's changed political situation. Instead, the concept of "critical mass", i.e., enough training/assistance, for enough relevant people, over a long enough time, may pertain. The impact of relatively intense assistance to small and inexperienced NGOs may simply be more profound than is the same level of experience provided to a broader range of entities with a wider range of functions. The nascent level of development of the CSOs sector at the time the program started may be another factor that contributes to the apparent impact of USAID's effort on CSOs versus government entities.

With respect to the fourth program beneficiary target -- changes in citizen's knowledge of their rights and responsibilities too little is known to draw any strong conclusions. Evidence from other USAID programs suggests that the results of civic education programs are not always as strong as donors expect, and both repetition and readiness are important factors in the absorption of program messages. The range of information and commentary has reportedly expanded over the program period and the media has become more assertive with coverage of which the government may not approve. However, even the best data on the provision of information is insufficient to support conclusions about its impact on its intended audience. More extensive research, of the type MDIC is beginning and along the lines of the poll that discerned differences between BBC and VOA listenership, and goes beyond that to ascertain audience response to specific programs, is needed.

Substantively, program outcomes in the human rights area have been better documented, and therefore look to be stronger than, for example, service, advocacy and watchdog outcomes in CSOs. The management outcomes that have been demonstrated for CSOs lie a step short of the kind of results that have been demonstrated in the human rights field. This is not to say that management improvement outcomes in CSOs are not important. Evidence from USAID programs elsewhere has made the importance of such improvements clear. But they are nonetheless qualitatively different from outcomes that have a direct effect on people. What is not clear about the program in Angola, however, is whether CSOs that work in areas other than human rights, e.g., health care, are having equivalent success which is simply not being reported. The program's success in the human rights field -- its clear human outcomes -- represents a

¹⁵Civil society organizations are emerging across the continent and it is likely that some of the momentum in Angola stems from people's knowledge about what is happening elsewhere.

significant program impact. But to say that where the program focuses on CSOs that are involved in human rights activities it is doing better than in with CSOs that focus on other areas is simply premature. More data are needed than are currently available to ensure comparative statements of this sort are valid.

With respect to the successes the program has had in the human rights area, the “bottom up” approach it has taken through CSOs may be a key factor in those successes. While the evaluation team does not have information on every instance of a human rights improvement over the program period to examine as a universe, reporting on outcomes of this sort in interviews carried out by the team was strongly tilted toward examples that emerged from the kind of “bottom up”, citizen driven process the program has encouraged. Greater attention by the Ministry of Justice to its role in monitoring human rights abuses, which the Mission itself reported in its FY 1997 R4 is a counter example, emerging as it did when Angola’s CSOs were in their infancy. Such examples do exist, but with no where near the frequency and visible impact as the kind of examples reported in the discussion of IR 1.1 above. Successful outcomes of the program in the CSO sector may also have been influenced by the growth of capacity in national NGOs to reach grass roots organizations, constituents and define their needs.

Finally, it is clear from the program record and evaluation interviews that the flexibility of most of USAID’s partners has been critical to the success the program has achieved. Even when changes in the ability of USAID’s partners to travel freely in the country is set aside, their ability to reprogram substantively was important. A wide range of program strategies developed before the resumption of hostilities were focused on building a consensus for national reconciliation. These seminars, training programs, plays and broadcasts as well as broader strategies and relationships had to be, and were, reworked by most partners to be of continuing value to the program after 1998.

B. What have Angolan organizations and institutions gained from USAID’s DG assistance?

As the foregoing results summary indicated, the evaluation suggests that different kinds of organizations have benefited not only differently but to different degrees from USAID’s SO 2 program. What organizations have gotten from USAID’s SO 2 program is, as already indicated is clearest for CSOs. With respect to these organizations, three things stand out:

- **Numbers Count.** There is no getting around the fact that there are more CSOs addressing a broader range of issues for a larger number of people than there were when USAID’s program started. This has allowed a growing number of Angolans an opportunity to voice their needs. Program outcomes in the human rights area are a direct result of the growing strength of this sector. Given the nature of USAID’s program and the emphasis it placed on CSO development, some portion of the credit for this growth and its impact belongs to USAID and its implementing partners.
- **So do Basic Skills.** CSOs cannot function effectively in the absence of skills in everything from financial management to fundraising, beneficiary needs assessment to coalition building and advocacy. Strengthening organizational capacity is only

essential to CSO effectiveness, it is happening in Angola. Some of the strongest documentary evidence found by this evaluation is the evidence of changes in basic skills in CSOs.

- **What Oz gave the Lion Was Courage.** NGOs can come into being and gain skills, but they will not have an important impact on society if they are unable to act based on their knowledge of their members desires and their convictions. Newspapers can run their presses, and radio stations can broadcast, but the same simple fact hold as true for them as it does for NGOs: Without courage -- the courage to tell the truth as they see it -- they are unlikely to become agents of change. While it is nearly impossible to quantify, and sometimes hard even to see, evidence from USAID's program in Angola suggests that courage is one of the things the organizations that receive USAID assistance are getting. Following participation in USAID partner programs, NGOs and other civic groups successfully challenged government on unfair policies, illegal practices, and unwillingness to enforce civil laws. As the number of NGOs has increased and NGOs have become more assertive, government officials have shown increased interest in NGO activities. These new relationships have encouraged a dialogue between civil society and government that did not previously exist. It opens "cracks" and further opportunities for dialogue and establishing trust.

Compared to relative ease with which the benefits of USAID's program to CSOs can be articulated, the team is less certain about the benefits to government entities and political parties. Certainly the skills of individuals within all of the organizations that have received training or participated in study tours has increased, but individual skill gains that do not translate into organizational change have not only limited returns, but also a limited lifespan. Individuals are never permanently attached to the organizations they are part of when they receive assistance. Their departure constitutes a net skill loss for organizations that have not found a way to absorb what their staff have learned and make that knowledge and skill base the organization's knowledge and skill base.

Proving that individual have acquired skills is thus only partially relevant for USAID's SO 2 program. More relevant is evidence of change in those organizations. From this evaluation, only limited evidence of this sort is available, e.g., reports of reorganization in a few political parties; a modest level of improvement in the dialogue within the National Assembly; more open participation in one or two political parties; and a few indications from the provincial level that a dialogue is opening up between government and the NGO sector. Compared to reports of organizational change and its impact in the CSO sector, the evidence of change in government and political parties is thin. While the evaluation process may explain some of the difference in these situations, the contrast is strong enough to suggest that organizations, other than CSOs, are not yet getting a lot of permanent benefits from USAID's assistance.

C. What have Angolans gained from USAID's DG assistance¹⁶?

Angolan citizens under colonial and independent governments have not participated in efforts to influence government policy or actions. Moreover, they have been denied opportunities or freedom to express political views. In the last few years, however, donor programs like the USAID/Angola D&G activity have created some opportunities for political expression, including criticism of government policy and actions. There has been a measurable increase in the number of groups and individuals, aware of their rights, and means to assert.

While the process is still nascent, the activities USAID's partners have contributed to this process, empowering organizations and individuals to express political views on all matters of interest to civil society.

- The fact that the CSOs these partners have trained, in turn, have trained and otherwise interacted with numerous other civil society organizations and individuals has resulted in a multiplier effect. It is analogous to dropping a stone into a calm lake. Each successive wave creates an ever widening circle leading to greater awareness of citizens' rights and how to express and realize them.
- Importantly, these programs have been sought as models by other national and international NGOs, and by the government for training local officials. For example, the Ministry of Planning has asked PACT to provide training to its staff in provinces and municipalities. As the Ministry of Planning request to PACT indicates, the demand for USAID-grantee training is not limited to NGOs. Knowledge of the increased effectiveness of NGOs trained by USAID grantees has spread widely. Another example is that the Ministry of Education has sought MCID's training manuals in human and civic rights for use in schools. If implemented, this could educate thousands of students in civic and human rights.
- Benefits come not only from what individual and organizations learn, but also from what they do. Actions taken by CSOs on human rights are bringing real benefits to people -- prisoners released, young boys safe from underage military conscription, women traders and street children are real beneficiaries of the kind of CSO action that World Learning's efforts have been able to stimulate. And will the numbers are still small, the level of direct benefits to people from such actions will rise as time and goes on and commitment grows.

The ripple phenomenon is developing an ever widening sense of empowerment in the population. While still in its early stages, it is clearly underway. Empowerment is a contagious process which will spread spontaneously among the general population once there is a critical mass of organizations and individuals to nurture and promote it.

¹⁶ USAID/Angola conceives all Angolans as the ultimate beneficiaries of its DG assistance activities. However, the direct beneficiaries, to date, are: organized civil society groups, such as NGOs and CBOs; Members of the National Assembly; Local Government Administrators; Political Parties; Journalists; and Human Rights activists.

While USAID's partners have raised the level of awareness among their counterpart organizations concerning gender issues in many programs, the evidence currently available does not suggest that there has been a significant change with respect to women becoming more active in the political process. Perhaps it is simply too early to discern measurable increases in women's political participation. Or perhaps greater focus on this program benefit will be required.

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Conclusions

Conclusions are based on information and data presented in the body of the report. To achieve brevity we have not attempted to repeat all details presented in the report here. We have, however, provided explanatory comments under some of the conclusions.

- **Strategic Objective 2 (SO2) “Increased National Reconciliation Through Strengthened Civil Society and Political Institutions” was established at a time when it was assumed that the peace process under the Lusaka Protocol would continue. The resumption of war in 1998 invalidated this assumption.** SO2 as currently phrased is not relevant under the changed circumstances. However, the sub-objectives of strengthening civil society and political institutions remain relevant and lay a foundation for working toward national reconciliation when the war ends.
- **The resumption of hostilities has had a discernable impact on USAID's SO 2 program** Expatriate personnel operate with security in Luanda and the coastal regions to the south. Yet, with the exception of the Savimbi faction of UNITA, political party leaders and parliamentarians are reachable in Luanda and the coastal areas. Also, trained Angolan replicators are carrying out grantee activities in areas where expatriates do not travel at this time, such as Huambo, Bie, and Benguela.
- **USAID's partners have taken positive action when appropriate to adjust their activities to the evolving political and security environment.**
- **Even in the current environment, aspects of USAID's SO 2 that focus on “Strengthened Civil Society and Political Institutions” are yielding results.** Achievement of these aspects of SO2, even in the absence of national reconciliation in the near future, can help lay a foundation for achieving democratic government in Angola in the future.
- **Achieving democracy in Angola will require broad political and economic reforms along with changes in political orientation of members of the current ruling elite.** The war and the mentality that has developed during thirty years of war are obstacles to reform. Similarly, the fact that the political ideology of many top leaders was, and in some cases still may be, an African version of Marxist-Leninism presents a challenge to those working toward the transition to a pluralist, multiparty democracy. However, neither the government

nor UNITA are monolithic organizations. Although there are problems in dealing with both of them, within each exist “targets of opportunity,” in that certain leaders appear open to accept change or even to lead efforts toward change.

- **USAID’s SO 2 efforts to strengthen civil society groups have been more successful than its efforts to strengthen political institutions.** This is mainly due to the war which created conditions in which the contest for influence and power shifted to the battlefield, thus slowing down the process of building political institutions (the National Assembly and political parties), whereas work with civil society groups in Luanda and the coastal provinces of Huila and Namibe could proceed without serious interruptions.
- **As long as hostilities persist, it will continue to be more difficult to work with political institutions than with CSOs.** This does not imply, however, that national or local level political processes or institutions should be abandoned by USAID/Angola until peace returns, all deputies return to the National Assembly or national elections are held.¹⁷
- **The departure of IRI’s resident director has, at minimum, created an impression of a lowered priority on USAID’s effort to strengthen Angola’s political parties.**
- **There is remarkable synergy between the various USAID-funded grantee projects and activities.** Examples of collaboration and synergy between partner activities provided in the all of the summaries of U.S. partner programs included as annexes to this report.
- **USAID and its partners are not collecting enough information of either a quantitative or qualitative nature on program outcomes, as opposed to activities and outputs.** USAID’s performance measures for its SO 2 programs are not necessarily appropriate or feasible. Even where measurement is possible, baseline data is lacking for most of the program IRs and sub-IRS and what does exist is not necessarily disaggregated by gender. Only two of the grantees are collecting pre-activity data on target groups.

B. Recommendations

Recommendations in this section are of two types. Primary recommendations which the MSI team has included reflect its views concerning steps that USAID/Angola can take to build upon its current successes and ensure that any future program in democracy and governance will be even more demonstrably successful. Secondary recommendations are recommendations made to the MSI team which are used in the context of this section to illustrate a broader point that MSI is trying to make. All secondary recommendations are offered to the Mission with the caveat that MSI does not have sufficient information to fully endorse them nor does it believe that it is appropriate for this team to do so given the broad program level charter laid out for it in the SOW. Secondary recommendations which are included do, however, represent local

¹⁷ Three National Assembly representatives are currently being held in jail without charges.

stakeholder views and interests which MSI believes warrant at least a minimal level of Mission attention.

1. That USAID/Angola, if it elects to have a democracy and governance program as part of its next Country Strategy, it:

- **Simplify its statement of the results it intends to achieve**, making that statement unidimensional, objectively measurable, and achievable within the time frame set for its strategy. The inclusion of three results in the current SO overly complicates both the management of an SO program and exponentially increases the difficulty of judging its success.
- **Eliminate national reconciliation as an intended SO level result of its democracy and governance program** unless and until the Mission is confident that the elements of the program it can put in place to achieve this objective meet the test of being both necessary and sufficient to accomplish that end. Given this dual criteria, it is MSI's expectation that the Mission will find that important elements of what would be needed to bring about reconciliation in Angola lie beyond the control, and perhaps beyond a reasonable stretch of its influence.
- **Build upon its successes with both CSOs and political institutions**. MSI's evaluation found more success on the CSO side of the current program than it found on the political institution side. But the political institution side was not a failure and there are solid pro-democracy arguments, with which the Mission is fully familiar, for maintaining support to both government entities and political parties in Angola.
- **Examine options for introducing new program elements that enhance the impact of already successful approaches**. The emphasis of current SO 2 program has been on activities has been heavily on a "bottom up" approach or strengthening the "demand" side of the political system. Evidence from the evaluation supports the wisdom of this emphasis. At the same time, MSI is aware that experience elsewhere suggests that the effectiveness of "bottom up" reform can be enhanced through "top down" measures that encourage such efforts. Depending upon a country's situation the "top down" measures might range from public Presidential support for the growth of the non-governmental sector to legislation that simplifies the creation of CSOs. On the political side, requirements for government transparency and consultations with stakeholders can have significant effects. In Angola a dual transition is needed -- one that takes the country not only from war to peace but also from central control to pluralism. Within an updated SO 2 framework, the Mission might wish to consider activities aimed at policy reforms that would complement its "bottom up" approaches for strengthening CSOs, political parties and government institutions.
- **Resolve to focus program activities such that the program does a few things very well**. On the CSO side, the current program has concentrated enough of its energies to bring about real change in the capacity of CSO organizations and to create a discernable momentum in the human rights field. This degree of concentration on the CSO side, whether by accident or intention, was not matched by a comparable degree

of focus on the political side of the SO 2 program, i.e., training for government institutions, for example, was both more general and intended for more heterogeneous. Brief evaluations of the kind the Mission contracted for with MSI can only begin to identify the areas of a complex program that work well. For a program a Mission is considering for renewal, extension or expansion, it is also wise to engage current implementers in an effort to identify “best practices.”

- **Commit to measuring performance and to using frequent reviews of performance measures to guide program management.** USAID’s current SO 2 program lacked realistic performance indicators and baseline data against which to measure progress. As a result, its returns on its evaluation investment were somewhat lower than they might have been had data on this program been systematically collected. Performance measurement does not work as an afterthought. The time to develop independent, hard-nosed performance indicators and systems for collecting data on those indicators is when a Results Framework is being drafted. All too often those who delay find that they have approved objectives that cannot be assessed and that after such objectives have been approved, their superiors are extremely reluctant to consider changes. Had USAID’s current SO 2 had and applied strong performance measures it might have been able to adjust its efforts in such a way as to produce results on the political institution side that were comparable to the results it produced on the CSO side.

USAID already has in place a proposed SO 2 revision that would split its current SO into two elements: A revised Strategic Objective [SO #2] “Strengthened Citizen’s Participation in the Political Processes” and a new Special Objective [SPO #2] “Parliamentary and Political Process Support.” For its proposed SO #2, the Mission also has a Results Framework (shown in Figure 2) which it approved internally in 1998. **These proposals are consistent with MSI’s recommendation for simplifying the Mission’s SO in this field. These proposals represent a good start, with the following caveat: USAID’s proposed SOP #2 should state a result. In its current form it does not do so.** And, as the preceding paragraphs make apparent, the establishment of sound performance indicators and the collection of baseline data are also key to a good start on a new phase of the Mission’s democracy and governance program. Linking partner reporting to the Mission’s own performance indicators and encouraging pre-and post testing and other types of comparative data analysis on the part of Mission partners is also recommended.

2. That the Mission collect and consider recommendations from local program stakeholders as it formulates its plans for the democracy and governance field for the next strategic planning period. In an evaluation of the type the MSI team undertook, program stakeholders set forth their ideas about what they believe would be useful ways in which USAID might program its assistance. Culling recommendations presented to teams is one way in which the Mission can begin to weigh stakeholder ideas. Another is to create a local forum in which such ideas can be presented directly to the Mission.

Because they represent local stakeholder interests and may be useful to USAID/Angola, the MSI team lists below a number of recommendations that were brought to its attention during the evaluation:

- **Listen when Government entities volunteer to be the focus for USAID Programs. High level support helps create success.** The Minister of Justice and the Vice Minister made it clear to MSI's team that they wanted to embark on reforms including establishing an improved legal foundation for human rights. Assistance for judicial reform and good governance (including anti-corruption) undertaken with the Ministry's collaboration, and hopefully leadership, could give other initiatives greater chances for success. Without a functioning and fair judicial system the rights of citizens, the media, and investors have little protection. The Justice Ministry already has a human rights group which might, with some help, become more effective. Another candidate to be considered for assistance is the Constitutional Revision Commission. Political parties, through some of the comments they made to the MSI team also made clear their interest in remaining a focus of USAID's attention.
- **Reward initiative.** Initiatives that support USAID program objectives can emerge from inside its program framework. They can also emerge outside that framework. In both instances it is in the Mission's interest to consider whether an effort to reward initiative will help it to multiply. To such examples emerged during the evaluation which warrant passing along in this regard.
 - One aspect of USAID's success on the CSO side of its current SO 2 program that warrants attention is the multiplier effect the Mission is getting from programs that spawn replications. Rewarding successful initiatives is one way to enhance their momentum. With this in mind the Mission might want to consider the feasibility of making available resources to support of activities of local NGOs which have received training from USAID grantees and who are engaged in replicator training. Under the current program, USAID's partners reported that training provided at interior sites which involved replication was much less costly than that provided in Luanda.
 - Radio Icclesia plays a sensitive and key role in providing free and relatively uncensored information to the public, consideration should be given to providing funding for expansion of its broadcast capabilities and, hence, expanding significantly its listening public. As an incentive, USAID might consider underwriting new programming capability that this provider cannot obtain on its own, e.g., a nation-wide shortwave broadcast capacity.
- **Maximize the latitude that USAID partners have for involving stakeholders and undertaking experiments that they believe can help further efforts to achieve broad IR and SO level objectives set by the Mission.** During the evaluation, two recommendations from USAID partners emerged which illustrate this principle. The merits of these recommendations need to be examined by USAID based on its more through understanding of the local situation. From MSI's perspective, the important point is for the Mission to listen to, and where it can, provide flexibility to its partners who are on the front line of the program trying to achieve results on the Mission's behalf.

- USAID partners made it clear to the MSI team that they would like the latitude to more frequently include government representatives in training programs that they provide for CSOs. The basis for this recommendation lies in the value these partners believe such participation will yield. Government is often the main problem faced by NGOs. Including Government representatives in training programs is a productive way to open up two way communication between these parties.
- USAID partners also want greater latitude to provide follow-up refresher courses for NGOs' trainees several months after the initial training. One grantee does this with excellent results. By providing refresher courses for trainees, the original training is reinforced, trainees can review problems encountered and share ideas on solutions. Such sessions will also give the grantee clues on how to improve the original training course.
- USAID partners are interested in creating a Communication and Support Centers for NGOs in cities which have adequate communications facilities and a number of NGOs are operating.. This recommendation was advanced by several grantees and should be explored with them. With respect to this idea, the team confirmed that internet connections existed in Luanda, Lubango, and Namibe. In addition, USAID grantees and the team's Angolan member pointed out that Huambo, Benguela, Lobito and Cabinda also have internet connections. One grantee recommended that the provincial level FONGA offices be used as the hub for NGO communications facilities. Another grantee suggestion was that internet capabilities be supplemented by providing two-way motorola radios for NGO local communication.
- Stakeholders in political parties are interested in the establishment of a Legal and Economic Center to develop position papers and write legislation.
- Legislators have parallel interest in a Center for Parliamentarians or some other mechanism that would provide for shared office space, communications (phone, fax, Internet), secretarial support, computer equipment, and a document library. The current absence of working space and facilities is a serious weakness for parliamentarians not in the majority party. They do not have space or facilities for review or preparation of legislation. The majority party has ample facilities and office space.

ANNEX A

CURRENT ANGOLAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT

1. The War and Peace Process

Since April 1961 Angola has been almost constantly at war, with only brief intervals of peace. Until independence in 1975 nationalist movements fought Portuguese colonialism. Immediately after independence, civil war erupted, initially involving three nationalist movements: the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The MPLA controlled Luanda and territory to the northeast of the capital. With support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, the MPLA installed a socialist political and economic regime based on the principles of Marxist Leninism. Reacting to the Soviet and Cuban presence and influence, the United States and South Africa provided assistance to the FNLA initially, and in later years, to UNITA.

With time, the FNLA dropped out of the war, leaving UNITA and the MPLA in the struggle. By 1990 a stalemate in the war resulted in a 2 two-year imperfect and unstable period of peace and the Bicesse Agreement, under which internationally supervised elections for president and the national assembly were held in September 1992. President Eduardo dos Santos received 46.6 % and UNITA leader Jonas Malheiro Savimbi 40.1% of the vote. In the legislative elections, the MPLA received 53.7% and UNITA 34.1%. No other presidential candidate or party received more than 2.5% of the vote. UNITA leader Savimbi rejected the election results and country-wide fighting resumed between UNITA and the MPLA government forces.

Another peace initiative, driven by international diplomatic pressure on the MPLA government and UNITA, coupled with a battlefield stalemate, resulted in the Lusaka Protocol of November 20, 1994. It provided for a cease-fire, formation of a unified army and police force, formation of a government of national unity and the disarmament and transformation of UNITA from an armed revolutionary movement into a political party. Under the Protocol, the United Nations was mandated to verify and monitor implementation of the Protocol. The mandate's tasks included a peacekeeper role, completion of the electoral process, and national reconciliation. A Joint Commission, made up of U.N., Government and UNITA representatives (with the U.S., Portugal, and Russia as observers) was responsible for oversight of the Lusaka Protocol implementation. Any accord violation verified by the U.N. or reported by one of the parties was to be discussed in the Joint Commission.

Both sides exhibited a degree of ambiguity concerning the agreement. Immediately before and during the signing ceremonies in Lusaka, MPLA military carried out attacks on UNITA controlled towns and bases in Angola.¹⁸ Savimbi used these attacks as a reason for not attending the signing ceremonies in Lusaka. He designated a subordinate, Eugenio Manuvakola,

¹⁸ For description of events and attitudes of leaders see Paul Hare, "Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace," U.S. Institute for Peace, Washington DC, 1998.

to sign the Protocol, and later criticized and punished Manuvakola for signing the Lusaka document. Some on the MPLA side also questioned the wisdom of a cease-fire. For example, the Army's Chief of Staff was quoted as saying that the Agreement, from a military perspective, was a mistake and that "only the total defeat of Savimbi can ensure peace...."¹⁹ Thus, chances for success of the peace process were reduced by a lack of confidence by leaders of both side in the process itself and in each other.

From the beginning there were violations in implementation of the terms of the Protocol by both sides. Violations by the Government were usually in the form of attacks on UNITA. The latter's violations appear to have been in complying only partially with the demobilization and disarmament provisions. Reportedly, UNITA sought to retain its best military units while demobilizing personnel who were sick, wounded, too old or young. The MPLA government has complained that while demobilization was underway, UNITA was clandestinely acquiring new arms and recruits for its forces.

The U.N. observer force, UNAVEM III, was authorized by the UN Security Council on February 8, 1995, but deployment was slow. Delays in UNAVEM deployment were due mainly to U.N. Security Council members' concerns over sending the "blue helmets" into a country where armed clashes were still sporadically occurring. The observer force reached full strength only in late 1996. Meanwhile, both sides used the absence of the observers as an excuse for dragging their feet on compliance. Importantly, both sides became accustomed to breaching terms of the peace process without the violations being clearly documented. Both sides complained of the violations of the other, often exaggerating the nature of violations. Only in 1996, did the process of quartering UNITA troops get underway. It proceeded sporadically for various reasons, including simple delays in establishing quartering areas.

Unrealistic deadlines were set by the international community which also contributed to noncompliance by both sides. In December 1996 nine UNITA generals took the oath of office to serve in the Angolan army. The UN Special Representative frequently called attention to military breaches of the peace process, but often without much effect on the parties.

Additional factors tending to undermine the peace process were provisions of the electoral law, which established a "winner take all" situation for control of the Government in the 1992 elections, coupled with the MPLA nomenclature retaining a one party mentality. The MPLA Government continued to behave as if a one party regime still existed. It responded to criticism with threats and arrests of journalists and opponents. Finally, the fact that both sides had access to resources (Government had oil and diamonds and UNITA had diamonds) to finance war undoubtedly also contributed to the instability of the peace process.

In a recent report, Human Rights Watch criticized the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, the late Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye, for not taking strong action against human rights violations. It reported that with better human rights monitoring and reporting, the ease with which both sides could abuse human rights would have been limited, thus avoiding the erosion of

¹⁹ Ibid.

confidence in and disintegration of the peace process.²⁰ This thesis appears doubtful, and Human Rights Watch's criticism of Beye seems unjustified. The two sides appear to have been much more concerned about military breaches of the terms of the agreement, which would result in shift of power, than they were about the other side mistreating civilians. Beye's reasons for not taking more vigorous action on human rights issues was that the situation was extremely sensitive and his main priority was to keep the peace process alive and try to minimize actions that would incite the sides to renew the war.

Despite the implementation problems the peace process had its accomplishments. Many of UNITA's forces were demobilized, nine UNITA generals were integrated into the FAA (Armed Forces of Angola), the Government of National Unity (GURN) was formed in April 1997, four UNITA-appointed Ministers and seven Vice Ministers took up cabinet portfolios, three UNITA Governors and seven Vice-Governors were designated.²¹ Importantly, 70 UNITA parliamentarians who had been elected in 1992 took their seats in the 220-seat National Assembly.

In the end, the burden of distrust hanging over the peace process and the problems listed above outweighed the positive aspects. In late 1998 it appears that the preferred option for top leaders on both sides was renewed war.

An important factor contributing to the demise of the Lusaka peace process was that the peacemakers and international community did not give enough attention to the fact that two transitions are underway in Angola. One is the transition from war to peace and reconstruction. The second transition is from a Marxist Leninist one-party state to a democratic and pluralist multi-party system. At least some in the MPLA leadership still have the mind set of their past. Some of those who accept changes still have little idea of how a pluralist system works. The repressive tendency of the regime made it difficult for UNITA's civilian and military elites to trust the MPLA Government. Thus, for the peace process to succeed in creating confidence, it should have gone beyond dealing with demobilization and disarmament to the broader issues involved in transition from a one-party state to a democracy. A serious flaw was the failure to make provisions for the social and economic integration of UNITA's elites and former fighters. In the absence of such measures, they had a strong leit motif to continue the war.

If either side expected in 1998 a quick victory, events of 1999 have dispelled those expectations. Apart from temporary gains, neither side seems able to dominate the other. None of the evaluation team's interlocutors predict victory by either side in the foreseeable future.²² For the moment, however, neither of the warring leaders is signaling willingness to return to the Lusaka peace process. President dos Santos' public stance is that the government will never

²⁰ Human Rights Watch, "Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process," www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/Angola.

²¹ USAID/Angola, "Strategy Update," FY 1998-2001., April 1998.

²² Since the team departed Angola, Government forces have attacked and appear to have take at least two of UNITA's strongholds.

again negotiate with Savimbi. The latter has declared the Lusaka peace process to be dead, but in a recent interview has said he is ready for negotiations on the “basis of a new reality in accordance with the today’s situation.”²³

In addition to the fact that a stalemate in the war seems likely, there are other developments that suggest that sooner or later the two sides will turn to negotiations again. Not all elements of the MPLA or UNITA favored the resumption of war in 1998, and certainly the Angolan people are tired of war. The leaders of the UNITA Renovada faction indicate that they have not given up hope on the peace process. Similarly, some of the evaluation team’s interlocutors on the government/MPLA side express a desire to return to the peace process.

The Catholic Church has also been active condemning the war and calling for peace in its Pastoral Letters (Cartas Pastorais). These letters have condemned both the government and UNITA. As the independent media has become more active in supporting the anti-war movement and criticizing the government (for mismanagement, corruption, etc.), they have come under increasing pressure by the government (e.g., Radio Icclesias’ recent conflict with the government for broadcasting a BBC interview with Savimbi).

Certain of the past gains of the peace process remain sustainable. Despite the damage done to the image of the UNITA Renovada party by the MPLA’s exploitation of its split from Savimbi, its faction in the National Assembly is poised to play an important role whenever another peace initiative is attempted (we return to this in sections three and four of the evaluation, analysis and recommendations respectively). The other small parties, similarly, would welcome an end to the war and a shift in the struggle from the battlefield to the political arena.

A positive development has been the appearance on the scene of a large number of international and national NGOs (about 400 national NGOs) which help fill the gap caused by the decline in government social services and the increase in poverty. Many of them aim at helping those who are suffering most from the war, namely children, women, displaced persons, disabled veterans, and the social and economic reintegration of those who for the greater part of their lives have lived in war conditions.

In addition to the delivery of services, NGOs serve a broader purpose. In a society emerging from years of one party rule without real grass roots participation in influencing government decisions or allocation of resources, the NGOs can contribute greatly to citizen participation in the political decisions and governance at local and provincial levels. They increase citizen awareness of their duties, rights and responsibilities. They also increase communal, municipal and provincial officials’ understanding of their duties and responsibilities in responding to citizen demands and needs.

Two of these grass-roots groups have initiated a nascent anti-war movement. A Peace Manifesto being circulated by GARP, and supported by many intellectuals, reportedly has

²³ “Savimbi Desiste de Ser Presidente: Alguem Acredita?” *Agora*, p. 1 & 24, 4 Sept. 1999.

obtained many signatures of support. A second anti-war movement by GAP has collected more than 1,000 signatures. Both efforts are heavily criticized by the Government.

2. Economic and Social Factors

Beginning about 1991, the Government began moving toward liberalization of the economy and privatization of para-statal enterprises. However, much of the privatization took the form of transfers from state monopolies to firms formed by highly placed government and/or military officers. Real liberalization and economic revival will require macro-economic policies to address problems such as overvalued exchange rates and subsidies which distort allocation of resources. High or hyper-inflation has continued to be a serious problem which has constrained investment and growth.²⁴ Ineffective fiscal management and lack of transparency in the management of government agencies and resources have impeded economic and social development.

Adding to the above-mentioned problems is the demobilization and reintegration of more than 100,000 soldiers. The urban unemployment rate is about 45%. This indicates that a huge humanitarian assistance effort is needed. The war has left serious demographic problems involving at least three million persons, including 1.2 million displaced persons, 70,000 war disabled, and large numbers of street children. The war has seriously impeded movement of goods and people. The index of dependency has worsened as a result of the combined impact of the war on the economically active population, migration, and involvement in non-productive activities such as war.

War conditions have led to the breakdown of the social fabric and the destruction of traditional moral and ethical values of trust and community solidarity. A climate of exclusion and social destitution, particularly affecting children, women and the old, has been created. The years of war and more than 20 years of political dominance by one party have stimulated the growth of a political and military elite which are benefiting from economic and commercial opportunities arising from the war situation.

The diversion of human and financial resources to the war represents more than 45% of the national budget. The education and health systems have virtually collapsed. Government expenditure on the social sector dropped from USD \$507 million in 1992 to USED \$181 million in 1995.²⁵

3. Implications for Democracy and Governance

The resumption of war in 1998 interrupted the peace process and probably marked the death of the Lusaka Protocol. The war also undoubtedly slowed down movement toward liberalization of the MPLA Government, but the situation has not completely returned to its pre-peace process status. The National Assembly is functioning, albeit at a minimal level. The media

²⁴ During the evaluation team's three week visit to Angola in September the dollar value of the Kwanza went from 4,000 to 7,000 readjusted Kwanzas to US\$ 1.00.

²⁵ UNDP, "Human Development Report, Angola 1997" p. 36.

are bolder in presenting facts and opinions at odds with Government attitudes than they were prior to the peace process. Some elements in the Government are not comfortable with the increase assertiveness of the media and incidents of repression occur. However, according to some political observers it is not as all encompassing as in the past.

As indicated previously, NGOs and CSOs have proliferated and are beginning to have an impact. Municipal and provincial officials in Huila and Namibe provinces are becoming accustomed to dialogue with and pressures from citizens groups, and in some cases seem to welcome the involvement of NGOs in local affairs. Peace petitions are circulating. Individual citizens and civic groups have begun to realize that their efforts can have an impact. These trends are most visible in the coastal areas where there is no active warfare.

A major constraint on liberalization and improvement in governance is the war. In addition to absorbing scarce resources and the attention of top leaders that could be applied to services for the population. Ending the war is complicated by the fact that small elites, both military and civilian, on both sides are able to benefit personally from economic/commercial activities related to the war. Under non-war circumstances, the principal beneficiaries from the war and corruption on the Government side would be under much greater scrutiny and pressure to end favoritism and corruption. Thus, the war provides the excuse for non-transparency and repression, as well as special opportunities for profit. Another factor which complicates the liberalization process is that some of the MPLA leadership cadre still cling to their basic Marxist-Leninist orientation, including the belief that for the good of the masses government must be in control, criticism avoided or suppressed, and opposition parties are undesirable rather than a necessity. Even those who have accepted the necessity of change, have difficulty changing old habits.

The "control oriented" attitudes of some in the MPLA leadership constitute a constraint on developing a pluralist multi-party democracy, but this should be considered a challenge rather than an insurmountable obstacle. Neither UNITA nor the MPLA are monolithic organizations. Supplementing the grass roots pressures from NGOs, elements in the media, and opposition political parties, are some reform-minded officials within the MPLA at the local and national levels who are prepared to work toward democratic change.

ANNEX B

USAID/ANGOLA EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

USAID/ANGOLA'S DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE ACTIVITIES

A. OBJECTIVE

The objective is to evaluate the overall performance of USAID/Angola's activities that have been employed to strengthen civil society organizations and political institutions. The evaluation, using qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, shall cover USAID/Angola's democracy and governance (DG) programs, particularly those in the areas of NGO capacity building, civic education, legislative and political party strengthening, media development and promotion/protection of human rights. The evaluation shall determine the impact of USAID/Angola's DG activities on Angola's democratic development. The report shall summarize the findings of the evaluation, and recommend activities to be considered for support in the future in order to impact on Angola's democratic development.

1. Background

Based on the country strategy plan (CSP), of 1995, USAID/Angola has strategic objectives in humanitarian assistance as well as democracy and governance [DG]. DG Programs constitute the Mission's Strategic Objective 2 (SO2). The DG strategic objective is to increase national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions. The purpose of the strategy was to promote Angola's transition from a devastated, war-torn country to a stable, peaceful and democratic society. To achieve this purpose, USAID's approach was to support civil society's reconstruction while at the same time taking advantage of the window of opportunity that political integration (i.e. the formation of a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation) to open up Angola's tightly controlled central government.

USAID/Angola, therefore, has been working with civil society organizations to rebuild independent channels for participation, an effort that involves capacity building of NGOs and human rights education. This CSO strengthening is also complemented with a parallel effort to strengthen the media as a channel for a free flow of information. Taking into consideration that this CSO effort may be futile unless political leaders possess the skills to respond to citizens' needs, the DG strategy also seeks to address the dearth of capacities at the upper-end of the political spectrum by providing assistance to government institutions at the local levels as well as in Angola's parliament.

To achieve its DG strategic objective, USAID/Angola works towards producing four intermediate results (IRs). These are: (IR 1) reconciliation opportunities among diverse groups of Angolans emerge; (IR 2) citizens exercise their democratic rights and responsibilities; (IR 3) facilitate accountable governance; and (IR 4) strengthen foundation for citizens and political parties to participate in free, fair and peaceful elections. Corresponding to these four IRs are sub-IRs as well as indicators for achievement of results (*Originally approved Results Framework attached as Annex I and Revised Framework is attached as Annex II*).

The 1995 Strategy was especially suited to the exigencies of being engaged in Angola. It provided clear strategic direction for the engagement, while retaining flexibility to respond to the evolving situation on the ground. It was stated in the strategy that the situation on the ground would remain fluid as the processes underway were dynamic. At a November 1997 meeting in Washington, AID/W and the Mission determined that the strategy did need to be updated.

In December 1997, in its efforts to effectively manage for results and ensure that its DG activities were responding to Angola's needs, USAID embarked on a series of meetings and workshops to determine the extent to which it is achieving its DG strategic objective. This process commenced with a Team Planning Meeting with the SO2 Team's core partners (i.e. existing grantees and contractor). The partners brainstormed on the most crucial components/issues for Angolan democratic development. This brainstorming was followed by a stakeholder analysis on whose interests should be taken into account in the design and implementation of USAID's activities. The last process consisted of four regional workshops, covering 13 of Angola's 18 provinces, with the objective of talking directly with the Mission's intermediate and ultimate customers.

Through the strategy update process described above, the Mission, its partners, stakeholders and customers arrived at a number of conclusions and recommendations for future USAID support in the democracy arena. The Mission, therefore, proposed to revise its SO2 in four principal ways: provide support to lower-level CSOs; make explicit the decision to involve women more meaningfully; split the SO into two different SOs to differentiate between political imperatives and future democracy-building directions; and capture synergies that exist between SO 2 and the Child Survival/Food Security activities (see Annex III). However, the Mission was advised, by AID/W during the 1998 R4 Review process, to postpone the update till the SOs revision in 1999.

In 1996, to support the achievement of the DG strategy, the following implementing partners began the following activities: International Republican Institute [IRI] strengthens political institutions (parliament and political parties); National Democratic Institute [NDI] works on local governance and civic education; PACT strengthens national NGOs institutional capacities; and World Learning builds the capacity of human rights organizations and the media (see Annex IV for a more detailed description of these activities).

In 1998, in addition to providing funding, through an inter-Agency Agreement, to Voice of America, the Mission added two new activities to the DG program: America's Development Foundation [ADF] which implements a project to develop the knowledge, attitudes, and practices needed among community-based organizations to promote and facilitate citizen participation in public decision-making; and Mississippi Consortium for International Development [MCID] which conducts a grassroots civic and political education program (see Annex IV).

As part of the Mission's Managing for Results goal, a need is foreseen for an evaluation of the overall performance of the activities described above. The information generated from the contract shall be used to improve the performance, effectiveness and design of future activities; serve as an input to the Mission's DG strategy review exercise; inform decisions whether to abandon activities or results packages which are not achieving intended results; and document findings on the impact of assistance.

2. Statement of Work

In executing the above-stated objective and from the qualitative and quantitative research, the evaluation shall:

- Determine the impact of USAID's DG activities on strengthening Angola's civil society organizations and political institutions; and
- Cull best practices, thereby enabling the Mission to improve the quality of future DG activities.

In particular, the evaluation shall analyze and address, as a minimum, the following sets of questions:

QUESTION 1: *Are the activities leading to the achievement of the strategic objective:* Is the approved strategy still valid and relevant to Angola's democratic development? Do Intermediate Results indicators validate their contribution to the strategic objective? What activities are the most successful and why? Which program outputs are achieving their intended outcomes? Are short-term (2-5 days) seminars/workshops effective in achieving the desired results or longer period of time is required? In the face of limited resources, should resources be directed to programs that operate at the community, local or national level? What aspects of USAID's assistance (civil society or political institution) have had the greatest impact on Angola's democratic development? What works and what does not? What program sequences make sense?

QUESTION 2: *What have Angolan organizations and institutions gained from USAID's DG assistance?* What impact does USAID's DG activities have on strengthening civil society organizations capacities to represent citizens' needs? Has there been any increase in the administrative and management capacities of Angolan non-governmental organizations? Is there any significant interest, by NGOs, to engage in human rights promotion and protection? Have the media training programs improved the technical ability of journalists to inform the public on governance issues? Was the National Assembly able to get the Executive branch of government to be more transparent and accountable? Has there been any substantial difference in the quality of debate in the National Assembly? Are political parties using more participatory techniques, by including more party members, in decision-making processes? Have political parties' hierarchies included more women?

QUESTION 3: *What have Angolans gained from USAID's DG assistance?* What impact does USAID's DG activities have on intended program beneficiaries²⁶? Was there any increase in citizens' ability to exercise democratic rights and responsibilities during 1996-

²⁶ USAID/Angola conceives all Angolans as the ultimate beneficiaries of its DG assistance activities. However, the direct beneficiaries, to date, are: organized civil society groups, such as NGOs and CBOs; Members of the National Assembly; Local Government Administrators; Political Parties; Journalists; and Human Rights activists.

1998 timeframe? Is there any increase in MPs' constituent outreach and relations? Have there been more women engaged politically?

To enhance the quality of the impact evaluation, these questions may be refined and narrowed by USAID and the contractor in the course of designing the evaluation; such refinements are not, however, expected to increase the ceiling price of the task order.

3. Tangible Results of Evaluation

USAID/Angola will judge contractor's success or lack thereof on whether tangible results and benchmarks, articulated below are met. In the event that any one or more of these requirements are not achieved or should the contractor at any time realize that they are not achievable, the contractor shall immediately advise USAID in writing and shall provide a complete explanation of the circumstances related thereto.

The report shall contain, most importantly, an evaluation of the impact of USAID's DG activities on strengthening Angola's civil society organizations and political institutions. The evaluation shall address issues such as the costs and benefits of various types of activities versus others (e.g., should more resources be devoted to strengthen civil society or political institutions in Angola?); what combination of activities can maximize results? The evaluation shall utilize a variety of evaluation methodologies; interviews shall not serve as the only means for obtaining data.

4. Benchmarks

1. No later than 7 calendar days after the task order is signed, the contractor shall design and present an evaluation methodology that gathers qualitative and quantitative data through a variety of mechanisms. In its presentation, the contractor may recommend changes to the specific questions that the evaluation seek to answer if the contractor believes that such changes will improve the quality of the evaluation. USAID will provide comments on the methodology within 7 calendar days after the methodology presentation. No later than 14 calendar days after receiving USAID's comments, the contractor shall revise the proposed evaluation methodology according to the aforementioned comments and send its team of specialists to Angola.

2. The contractor shall undertake a field trip to Angola for duration of 20 calendar days to evaluate the impact of USAID's activities. Upon arrival in Angola, the evaluation will spend the first day with SO Team for: briefing; refining of questions; clarification of definitions; prioritization of issues; timeline, etc. Evaluation shall be conducted in some of the provinces of SO2 program implementation. SO 2 implementing partners currently work in the following provinces: Luanda, Huambo, Benguela, Bie, Kwanza Sul and Huila.

3. The contractor shall present the draft of the report to USAID no later than August 15, 1999. The draft shall present the research methodology and contain a stand-alone executive summary (between 2-5 pages) that can be utilized as a briefing paper.

4. USAID will return its comments to the contractor within 15 calendar days (no later than August 30, 1999). The contractor shall then revise the report according to the

comments and present the final report to USAID within 15 calendar days (no later than September 15, 1999).

5. Staffing

While USAID wishes to give the contractor maximum flexibility to propose the evaluation methodology and the types of personnel to implement the methodology, it reserves the right to approve team of specialists to be proposed by the contractor. It should be noted that USAID/Angola expects the execution of this evaluation should be by a Core Team of two to four specialists with a logistics coordinator in Luanda; the Mission requires the use of Angolan talent as part of the Core Team. It is expected that no less than half of the members of the Core Team will have demonstrated skills of written and oral communications in both English and Portuguese.